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The enduring conflict between evolutionary theorists and
creationists has focused on America's public schools. If these
schools had no need to teach about the origins of life, each side
might content itself with promoting its favored worldview and
declaring its opponents narrow-minded and dogmatic. But edu-
cators have to decide what to teach, and because the Supreme
Court has declared that public schools may not teach religious
propositions as true, the First Amendment is crucially implicated.
On close examination, many of the controversial constitu-
tional issues turn out to be relatively straightforward, but others,
posed mainly by the way schools teach evolution and by what they
say about "intelligent design" theory, push us to deep questions
about the nature of science courses and what counts as teaching
religious propositions.
In this article, I first sketch the basic conflict between evolu-
tionary theory and creationism and describe the opposition of
creationists to the teaching of standard evolutionary theory. I
then state the basic educational and constitutional questions
about evolution, standard creationism, and "intelligent design."
After exploring of five fundamental premises that, in combina-
tion, generate the most troubling questions about science, relig-
ion, and the public schools, I turn to claims of miracles. Like
* University Professor, Columbia Law School; A.B., 1958, Swarthmore
College; B. Phil., 1960, University of Oxford; L.L.B., 1963, Columbia Law
School. In my work on this article, I benefitted greatly from discussions at the
University of Virginia, the University of Colorado, the University of Texas, and
the Fifteen Minute Paper Group at Columbia Law School, from individual com-
ments by Philip Kitcher, Michael Dorf, Melvin Eisenberg, James Nickel, and
David Mapel, and the fine research and editing of Katherine Bobbitt.
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assertions that God has intervened in natural processes of devel-
opment, these claims suppose that God transcends or violates sci-
entific principles; their investigation suggests that scientific
procedures may help identify limits of science.
With this background set, I inquire whether evolution, Gen-
esis creationism, and intelligent design qualify as appropriate
subjects for science courses in public schools. I suggest that
nothing should be presented as scientifically based unless it is
minimally plausible from a scientific point of view. I briefly
explain why evolutionary theory undoubtedly qualifies, and
examine the status of negative arguments directed against scien-
tific theories, including estimates of extreme improbabilities. I
contend that if one is interested in what is true, overall, one can-
not reasonably reject negative arguments out of hand on the
ground that they fail to offer an alternative scientific explana-
tion. I make the obvious point that a negative argument against
one theory does not support any single alternative, unless that is
itself the most persuasive of various alternatives to the challenged
theory.
After arguing that a theory should not be disqualified from
science courses simply because it suggests a supernatural power, I
address the thorny problem of whether a theory fails if it does
not offer a natural explanation of occurrences. I contend that a
theory properly falls within the domain of science courses if,
grounded in scientific evidence, it asserts a limit to scientific
explanation. Finally, I suggest that a theory should not be
rejected altogether on the basis that its proponents are not fairly
open to alternative evidence, though that certainly is a reason for
great caution in evaluating their claims.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that evolution definitely
belongs in science courses and that any account approximating
the literal reading of Genesis does not. Students should be
informed of uncertainties and possible gaps in dominant evolu-
tionary theory and told that, if any supplements are needed (a
matter in doubt), intelligent design is one conceivable
alternative.
The discussion then shifts from what belongs in a science
course to what counts as teaching religion, the crucial issue for
constitutional purposes. Teaching Genesis creationism is teach-
ing religion, whether or not any reference is made to the Bible,
because the only substantial basis for believing in that account is
religious. Teaching intelligent design is religious if that theory is
presented as true or as the alternative to dominant evolutionary
theory. A decision not to teach evolution is also religious,
because religious views are the only likely basis for exclusion.
20]STABIISHING RELIGIOUS IDEAS
Harder questions are raised by how a school treats perspectives
that compete with scientific ones. Science teachers should note
that not everyone accepts science as a more reliable source of
truth than religious authority, but serious development of com-
peting perspectives should be reserved for history courses or
courses in culture or comparative religion (for the few schools
that offer these).
The central principle of constitutional law for this subject is
that public schools should not teach the truth or falsity of relig-
ious propositions. Judicial application of this principle leaves
educators considerable latitude about how to treat the develop-
ment of life and other scientific subjects, but Supreme Court
decisions and constitutional analysis suggest that what I have
indicated counts as religious teaching is out of bounds.
II. EVOLUTION AND CREATIONISM: THE BASIC CONFLICT
Although not the first scientist to suggest the idea of evolu-
tion, Charles Darwin, in his 1859 On the Origin of Species, "was the
first thinker to amass together, in one systematic volume . . . all
the evidences from various scientific fields of study relevant to
this topic."1 The central thesis of evolution, Philip Kitcher has
written, "is that species are not fixed and immutable. One kind of
organism can have descendants that belong to a different kind.
From one original species, a number of different kinds may be
generated."2 Darwin's main explanation for this evolutionary
descent with modification contrasted with the earlier theory of
Chevalier de Lamarck, who assumed that animals developed pro-
gressively as members of one generation passed on adjustments
they had made during their lives to future generations; the illus-
tration most commonly offered has been giraffes, who stretch
their necks to eat foliage, giving birth to longer-necked off-
spring.3 Although maintaining a place for Lamarckian-type
1. JEFFRIE MURPHIY, EVOLUTION, MORALITY, AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 47
(1982). According to Dorothy Nelkin, the primary contribution of The Origin of
Species was "to organize and synthesize a set of ideas that had pervaded the sci-
entific literature for more than fifty years." DOROTHY NELKIN, THE CREATION
CONTROVERSY 25 (1982).
2. PHILIP KITCHER, ABUSING SCIENCE: THE CASE AGAINST CREATIONISM 7
(1982); see also ROBERT T. PENNOCK, TOWER OF BABEL 55 (1999) (noting that in
one generic sense evolution means "change over time," but that Darwin meant
by evolution "descent with modification").
3. EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND
AMERICA'S CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE 14 (1997). However, according to
Gordon Rattray Taylor, Lamarck did not write about the necks of giraffes; and,
in fact, giraffes need long necks mainly to reach the ground (given their long
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adjustments,4 Darwin suggested that the leading engine of devel-
opment was a process of natural selection, according to which
characteristics that individual animals and plants possessed from
their beginnings did or did not continue into subsequent genera-
tions according to their survival value.5 Organisms better fitted
for survival in their environments were more successful in gener-
ating offspring with their characteristics than were organisms
poorly fitted for survival.
Darwin's own approach has been filled out and modified,
but prevailing ideas fall within the general frame of Darwinian
evolutionary theory and are referred to as a neo-Darwinian
synthesis.6
Modern scientists place the age of the earth at somewhere
between 4.2 and 4.8 billion years. Life appeared after roughly a
billion years, and for the next two billion years and more, all life-
forms were single-celled organisms, such as bacteria and algae.7
Not until the last billion years did these single-cell life-forms
develop into all the complex plants and animals that have popu-
lated Earth.
Genetic theory has supported Darwin's idea of natural selec-
tion.8 Changes in organisms over generations occur both
because of recombinations of genetic characteristics9 and muta-
tions (alterations in the molecular structure and arrangement of
genes).'" Diversity among similar species is largely explained by
reproductive isolation; thus animals in Australia differ from those
in other places in the world. Natural selection, the survival of
changes that better suit their carriers to survive, accounts for at
least a substantial amount of evolutionary development. Modern
evolutionists disagree about just how much natural selection
explains; "neutralists" contend against "selectionists" that
chance-what is termed "genetic drift"-accounts for more
legs), not to eat foliage. GORDON RAT-TRAY TAYLOR, THE GREAT EVOLUTION MYS-
TERY 38-42 (1983).
4. LARSON, supra note 3, at 16.
5. Although Darwin's account covers both plants and animals, I shall
largely restrict myself to animals. See NELKIN, supra note 1, at 26.
6. KITCHER, supra note 2, at 17.
7. SeeJohn Horgan, Life Against the Odds, UNESCO COURIER, May 2001, at
http://www.unesco.org/courier/2001_05/uk/doss2l.htm (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
8. KITCHER, supra note 2, at 16-21.
9. In a population in which half the people had two blue genes for eye
color and half had two brown genes, the number of brown-eyed people would
increase with intermarriages, because the brown-eye gene is dominant.
10. KITCHER, supra note 2, at 21, 55.
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change than has commonly been recognized." Scientists also
disagree over Darwin's idea that evolutionary development was
gradual. Some modern evolutionists have offered a punctuated-
equilibrium model, according to which evolution is jerky rather
than continuous-with periods of stability followed by ones of
substantial change. 2 A few theorists claim further that not only
the timing of evolution but also its mode differs from the gradu-
alist account; major changes may occur from macromutations
rather than from a succession of unnoticeable alterations.'
3
Darwin drew from various sources to support his theory.' 4
Variation under domestication, that is, selective breeding by
human beings, proved that species can be modified. The
remarkable similarity of embryos of various species, and the simi-
larities in the anatomy of widely variant species, such as lizards
and human beings, suggested derivation from common ances-
tors. Fossils showed that species developed from simpler to more
complex. Finally, variations in species in isolated locales, such as
the Galipagos Islands, indicated evolution from ancestors that
were common to those species and to related species found
elsewhere.
The support of these sources for evolutionary theory has
been bolstered by more recent discoveries. Molecules of closely
related species have DNAs that are nearly identical in chemical
composition and sequence.' 5 Astronomical physics and the use
of radioactive isotopes to date rock fragments show the earth is
billions of years old. Although the fossil record has yielded rela-
11. Id. at 26-27.
12. See N. ELDREDGE, TIME FRAMES: THE RETHINKING OF DARWINIAN EVOLU-
TION AND THE THEORY OF PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA (1985); Stephen Jay Gould,
The Meaning of Punctuated Equilibrium, and Its Role in Validating a Hierarchical
Approach to Macroevolution, in PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION 83-104 (R. Milkman
ed., 1982). Richard Dawkins suggests that the difference between a standard
neo-Darwinian view and the theory of punctuated equilibrium is slight. RICHARD
DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER 223-52 (1987); see also KENNETH R. MILLER,
FINDING DAR WIN'S GOD 111-15 (1999) ("The driving force behind punctuated
equilibrium was an attempt to enhance the novelty and importance of a rela-
tively modest observation about the fossil record" that was not really at odds
with what Darwin himself said.). H. Allen Orr describes changes in Stephen Jay
Gould's account of punctuated equilibrium and notes the theory's decline in
the 1990's. H. Allen Orr, A Critic at Large: The Descent of Gould, NEw YORKR,
Sept. 9, 2002, at 132.
13. KITCHER, supra note 2, at 148-49.
14. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 47-50.
15. See generally Ernan McMullin, Plantinga's Defense of Special Creation, in
INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS: PHILOSOPHICAL, THEOLOGI-
CAL, AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 178 (Robert T. Pennock ed., 2001) [hereinaf-
ter INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS].
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tively few species intermediate between earlier and later species,
it clearly reveals that more complex life-forms followed simpler
ones. Studies of existing species prove that over time animals
can change characteristics to fit their environments better. In
perhaps the best-known, but now controversial example, the
great majority of peppered moths became darker, and thus less
conspicuous to predators, where pollution had darkened the
trunks of trees. 6 As Philip Kitcher puts it, "[o]rthodox neo-
Darwinians believe that these modifications are the stuff of which
large-scale evolution is made."17
Darwin's theory understandably disturbed many traditional
Christians. It seemed to remove human beings from their
exalted status in God's plan of creation. According to Genesis,
God created man (and woman) in His own likeness and with
dominion over the animals. If God created human beings to rule
the earth, one could easily assume that they have rational and
moral capacities qualitatively different from those of other ani-
mals. According to evolutionary theory, the development of
human life can be explained without reference to God's creative
hand; and if human beings are one link in a long continuous
chain, no vast gulf may separate their qualities from those of sim-
ilar animals.' 8 Yet superior species may be in the offing if we do
not manage to destroy life on Earth.
The deterministic quality of Darwinian evolution and its
dependence on random mutations have also troubled those who
believe that life is part of God's plan and that human beings can
achieve their own true good by responding to that plan. Ever
since Darwin wrote, many religious people have regarded his the-
ory as threatening the grounds of religious belief and of morality,
though the precise objections have varied and their intensity has
waxed and waned.19 Those who search for an alternative scien-
16. KITCHER, supra note 2, at 25. Critics have disputed the reliability of
claims about peppered moths. See JONATHAN WELLS, ICONS OF EVOLUTION-
SCIENCE OR MYrH? WHY MUCH OF WHAT WE TEACH ABOUT EVOLUTION IS WRONG
137-57 (2000), for a chapter debunking the "myth" of the peppered moth,
whose evidentiary role in respect to evolution survived a close examination by
Michael Majerus. MICHAEL E. N. MAJERUS, MELANISM: EVOLUTION IN ACTION
97-156 (1998); see a/SoJUDITH HOOPER, OF MOTHS AND MEN: AN EVOLUTIONARY
TALE (2002) (providing a narrative of events). The principle that natural selec-
tion can work changes within species is not doubted by most creationists.
17. KITCHER, supra note 2, at 26.
18. See PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 43-45.
19. See, e.g., LARSON, supra note 3, at 22-27; CHRISTOPHER P. TOUMEY,
GOD'S OWN SCIENTISTS: CREATIONISTS IN A SECULAR WORLD 31-146 (1994).
According to Toumey, from the early twentieth century to the latter part, the
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tific theory have been largely motivated by their distress over the
religious and moral implications of Darwinism.
Evolutionary theory conflicts with a literal reading of Gene-
sis, according to which God created other animals and human
beings within a span of days.20 And if one uses the Bible to mark
the earth's age, taking the days of creation as days of ordinary
length, one would arrive at roughly 6,000 to 10,000 years. 2 1 Mod-
ern "creation scientists" reject prevailing Darwinian understand-
ings to a far greater degree than did Darwin's early opponents.
22
A popular modern view, set out in a 1961 book called The Genesis
Flood, attributes geological evidence to Noah's flood and claims
that physical processes have not been uniform over time.23 Crea-
tionists believe that God created all the basic "kinds" of animals
at the same time. Whatever evolution has occurred is within
kinds, not from one kind to another. Although the notion of
"kinds" is imprecise, cats are not of the same kind as dogs, and
human beings are not of the same kind as apes. 24 The fossils of
simpler organisms tend to appear in lower strata of rocks because
these creatures were less able to escape from the waters of Noah's
flood that engulfed the earth. At the time of the great flood, the
basic moral complaint about evolution has shifted from fear of determinism to
fear of randomness. Id. at 49.
20. In the passages with which Genesis begins, Genesis 1:1-31, God cre-
ated plant life on the third day, bird and water life on the fifth day, and land
animals and human beings on the sixth day. (Genesis 2:4-24 also contains an
account of creation, one that is variously interpreted as a separate creation story
or as supplementing the first account.) Robert Pennock notes that many crea-
tionists accept the idea that the days of the creation represent ages. PENNOCK,
supra note 2, at 15-16.
21. In McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1268 (E.D. Ark.
1982), Judge Overton said that "creationist writings ... place the age [of the
earth] at between 6,000 and 20,000 years .... "
22. Most earlier opponents acknowledged the ancient age of the earth
and were concerned mainly to claim that human beings had not evolved from
inferior species. STEVEN GOLDBERG, SEDUCED BY SCIENCE: How AMERICAN RELIG-
ION HAS LOST ITS WAY 26-30 (1999). Among those taking this more moderate
view was William Jennings Bryan, whose opposition to evolution spurred the
Tennessee law under challenge in the Scopes case. See generally LARSON, supra
note 3.
23. JOHN C. WHITCOMB, JR., & HENRY M. MORRIS, THE GENESIS FLOOD
(1961); see GOLDBERG, supra note 22, at 30-32; TOUMEY, supra note 19, at 31-35.
The basic idea of "flood geology" had been set out earlier in George McCready
Price's The New Geology, published in 1923.
24. If separate species are understood to refer to categories of animals
that cannot interbreed, many closely related animals are separate species. Crea-
tionists do not deny that one species, in this sense, could evolve into another
species.
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nature of physical processes changed to such an extent that mod-
ern techniques of dating rocks, etc., are wholly unreliable.
What evidence supports the creationist story? For the most
part, the argument is that the theory of evolution is unconvinc-
ing. Creationism wins by default, because evolution and crea-
tionism are the only plausible explanations for the development
of species. But positive evidence has been claimed. Notably,
some creationists have asserted that the bedrock along the
Paluxy River in Texas contains fossils of human beings alongside
those of dinosaurs, who became extinct long before human
beings appeared on the scene, according to evolutionary theory.
(The particular claim about Paluxy River fossils has been substan-
tially discredited.)
2 5
One can find Darwinian evolutionary theory unconvincing
as a complete explanation of life's development without claiming
that science supports the literal reading of Genesis. What propo-
nents have called "intelligent design 21 6 is one such theory.
Although the views of these theorists are far from uniform, they
reject much less of the dominant scientific understanding than
does standard creationism and they make far fewer claims about
the details of what happened.2 7 The theory has been said to
involve two basic assumptions: intelligent causes exist, and they
can be detected empirically (by discerning specified complex-
ity).2 Although intelligent design claims are reasonably under-
stood as falling within a wider ambit of creationist approaches, I
shall refer in this article to "intelligent design theory" to avoid
any confusion with Genesis creationism. I shall also concentrate
25. According to one recent summary, "[tioday most 'scientific' creation-
ists hedge or disavow the claim that dinosaurs and humans coexisted on the
Paluxy. This is because scientists have shown that the putative human tracks
were made by dinosaurs or were hoaxed." Rich Fox, Debunking the Paluxy River
Claims, at http://www.usd.edu/anth/cultarch/paluxybib.html (presenting a list
of references, both creationist and noncreationist, compiled by Paul V.
Heinrich) (Mar. 4, 1996) (on file with the Notre DameJournal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy). Robert Pennock provides a summary of events and also rebuts
positive creationist evidence based on the scarcity of moon dust and on human
population growth. PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 216-26.
26. See generally INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra
note 15.
27. They may actually accept major theses about evolution or may not
commit themselves one way or another. Someone might refuse to commit him-
self because he is in genuine doubt or because he does not want to lose allies
who would support a more generic creationist position.
28. See Access Research Network, Frequently Asked Questions About Intelligent
Design, at http://www.arn.org/idfaq.htm (2003) (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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on the theory in its most modest form, because this is the form
that has the most plausibility from a scientific point of view.?9
III. PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHING ABOUT THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE
Many Christian Fundamentalists, accepting the literal truth
of the Bible, have opposed the teaching of evolution as true in
public schools.3" Believing that evolutionary theory conflicts with
God's revealed truth and that it is an atheist idea that under-
mines both religious faith and morality, they have tried to purge
evolution from the curriculum, to have it balanced by "creation
science," or to have it labeled as "only a theory."
During the past century, a few states adopted laws forbid-
ding the teaching of evolution, one of which the Tennessee
Supreme Court sustained in 1925 when it reviewed a teacher's
conviction in the famous Scopes trial (the "Monkey Trial").31 Of
more practical importance was successful opposition to text-
books containing evolutionary theory, up through the 1950s.32
Because publishers seek uncontroversial books that will sell in
major markets, a determined minority can affect the content of
texts. Conservative Christians lobbying for "acceptable" books
have had an influence far beyond their numbers in states, most
notably Texas and California, where texts are approved by a cen-
tral state authority. Before 1960, high-school biology texts gave
much less prominence to evolutionary theory than it enjoyed in
the field of biology itself.
29. That is, the more a theorist rejects about dominant evolutionary the-
ory and the more he asserts about how divine intelligence created, the more
difficult it becomes to render the claims plausible on the basis of naturalistic
evidence.
30. The term "Fundamentalist" is drawn from a series of essays published
from 1905 to 1915 called The Fundamentals which were opposed to modernism
in religion. Some, but not all, of the early essays were conciliatory toward the
scientific theory of evolution. See LARSON, supra note 3, at 20. The label "Funda-
mentalist" is itself now somewhat controversial, and critics use it more fre-
quently than do the people whose views fall within the designation. But terms
such as Conservative Christian or Evangelical Christian are less precise for our
purposes, because many people within those designations do not accept biblical
literalism. Robert Pennock remarks that many creationists "disavow the Funda-
mentalist label," and that many evangelicals believe in "biblical inerrancy." PEN-
NOCK, supra note 2, at 8.
31. A perceptive and readable account of the trial and its significance is
in LARSON, supra note 3.
32. NELKIN, supra note 1, at 33, writes, "A scholarly survey of the content
of biology texts up to 1960 found the influence of antievolutionist sentiment to
be persistent, if undramatic, and showed that the teaching of evolution actually
declined after 1925."
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After the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik in 1957, the first
rocket to circle the earth, government officials, concerned with
the quality of science education, helped finance new series of sci-
ence texts, including biology texts that treated evolution more
fully.
33
In 1968, in Epperson v. Arkansas,3 14 the Supreme Court held
invalid a statute that forbade teaching of the theory that man-
kind descended from a lower order of animals. Justice Fortas
wrote that a state cannot require that teaching be tailored to the
principles of any religious dogma; the Arkansas law proscribed
teaching part of a body of knowledge "for the sole reason that it
is deemed to conflict with ... a particular interpretation of the
Book of Genesis .. .
Epperson set the stage for the modern conflict over evolution
and creationism. Rather than aiming directly to block all men-
tion of evolution, creationists have sought to have evolution
downplayed, treated as only unconfirmed theory, not truth, and
"balanced" by teaching of creationism, so that students can
"make up their own minds." Finally, and importantly, many crea-
tionists have argued that creationism itself can have the status of
science, "scientific creationism" or "creation science."
Creationists were successful in having Arkansas and Louisi-
ana adopt Balanced Treatment Acts. The Arkansas law required
schools to present both evolution and creation science; the Loui-
siana law declared that they should present both or neither. Five
years after a district court rejected the Arkansas act36 the
Supreme Court held Louisiana's statute unconstitutional in
Edwards v. Aguillard,37 concluding that the legislature had a for-
bidden aim to advance religion. The Court has not explicitly
ruled that all decisions by school boards or teachers to present
scientific creationism are necessarily unconstitutional. A poll
taken two decades ago indicated that, when asked, roughly three-
fourths of American respondents said that both evolution and
creationism should be taught in schools.38
In 1999, the Kansas State Board of Education took a differ-
ent tack, one it rescinded less than two years later. It removed
evolution (and the Big Bang theory) from its 7 1-page science cur-
33. Id. at 39-53.
34. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
35. Id. at 103.
36. McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
37. 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987).
38. NELKIN, supra note 1, at 145-46.
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riculum.3 9 Although local school districts were free to teach
evolution, the subject was not included in statewide tests for eval-
uating students. Stephen Jay Gould, the late preeminent geolo-
gist, remarked caustically that the new standards provided "a
virtual guarantee, given the realities of education, that this cen-
tral concept of biology will be diluted or eliminated, thus reduc-
ing courses to something like chemistry without the periodic
table, or American history without Lincoln." ''
IV. BASIC QUESTIONS
Between literal-Genesis creationism and dominant evolu-
tionary theory, science provides a decisive verdict for evolution. 4 '
Even were these the only two alternatives, we would face educa-
tional questions about what public schools should teach students
concerning perspectives that reject dominant scientific theories:
Do these belong in science courses or elsewhere in the curricu-
lum, or are they not the business of public education?
Crucial constitutional questions would stand in the wings: If
the main reasons for teaching creationism or for not teaching
evolution are religious, does that render either decision uncon-
stitutional? Can religious reasons permissibly play a role in edu-
cational choices? What is the constitutional consequence if
legislators (or educators) are persuaded, unjustifiably, that crea-
tionism is plausible scientifically? These particular constitutional
questions raise a more general inquiry aboutjudicial responsibili-
ties: How far should courts leave curricular choices to educa-
tional authorities, rather than ruling that their choices trespass
on the religion clauses of the First Amendment?
These questions hold substantial interest, but the gulf
between Genesis creationism and dominant evolutionary theory
conceals yet more perplexing issues. Suppose that educators are
attracted by the more modest theory of intelligent design.
Accepting major aspects of dominant evolutionary theory, they
doubt that it completely explains the development of complex
forms of life, further doubt that any natural scientific account
39. See Steve Benen, Evolution Evasion, CHURCH & STATE, Oct. 1999, availa-
ble at http://www.au.org/churchstate/cs10991/htm (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy). For the Board's reversal, after a
change in membership, see Kate Beem, Emphasis on Evolution Adopted by Kansas
Board, KAN. CITv STAR, Feb. 15, 2001, at Al.
40. Stephen Jay Gould, Dorothy, It's Really Oz, TIME, Aug. 23, 1999, at 59.
41. This reflects my assessment, based both on what scientists believe and
on my limited acquaintance with competing claims. The reader should be fully
aware that I have not acquired competence to judge all that is scientifically
relevant.
2003]
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could ever do so, and conclude that a full explanation may
include an input of "intelligent design" that is not subject to ordi-
nary scientific explanation.
Does such a version of "intelligent design" represent a plau-
sible assessment of the limits both of dominant evolutionary the-
ory and of ordinary scientific explanation? Does that claim
belong in a science course, or is it disqualified because it con-
tains (or loosely implies) a religious conclusion or because it fails
to meet the requisites of scientific theory? What exactly is sci-
ence, and what belongs in a science course? Does intelligent
design belong somewhere in the curriculum, if not in science
courses?
When we turn to constitutional analysis, the issue about what
is science turns into the question of whether "intelligent design"
is a religious theory. If so, should it not be taught because doing
so would establish a religion, or need (or may) it be taught, for
reasons of fairness and balance, because dominant evolutionary
theory contradicts widely held religious premises and may itself
be religious?
Examination of these questions proves to have much
broader application for thought about the uncertain boundaries
of science and religion. The challenge to evolution provides the
most striking modern illustration, but similar conflicts with
respect to other branches of science could arise in the future, as
they have in the past. I approach the narrower topics of this arti-
cle via broader theoretical analysis and comparison. One reason
for this is to provide a perspective liberated from the hot contro-
versy about evolution and creationism. A second reason is that
the article's major contribution lies exactly in this broader analy-
sis, which not only assists resolution of what schools should teach
about life's development, but also reaches other potential con-
flicts involving science and religion.
V. SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND TRUTH
Five fundamental premises, in combination, generate the
most troubling questions about science, religion, and the public
schools. (1) Schools should not teach the truth of religious pro-
positions. (2) For many people, the domains of science and
religion overlap significantly. (3) Anyone's assessment of what is
true, overall, will include an evaluation of all relevant sources of
truth, including any religious sources he or she credits. (4) Mod-
ern science is committed to methodological naturalism. (5) Sci-
entific conclusions can bear on the likely truth of religious
propositions. An exploration of these premises helps us grasp
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what public schools should teach about evolution and the alter-
natives of creationism and intelligent design.
A. Public School Teaching and Religious Propositions
The Supreme Court has made evident that public schools
may not teach particular religious doctrines as true or as false. A
high-school text or teacher should not teach as the official truth
thatJesus was God incarnate or that the doctrine of the Trinity is
seriously misguided.42 This article is not the occasion to defend
this aspect of the Supreme Court's establishment jurisprudence
against critics who would have the Establishment Clause inter-
preted much less expansively. (These critics may take my consti-
tutional analysis as developing implications of a prevailing
doctrine they would like the Court to abandon.)
If a teacher's only basis for believing a claim is religious, her
assertion of it amounts to a teaching of religion, even though the
claim does not involve any explicit religious proposition. Thus, if
she says, "The earth is exactly 6,000 years old," and her belief is
based solely on the words of the Bible, her assertion is religious.4"
Public schools inevitably do teach as sound certain factual
propositions and moral and political principles that conflict with
the doctrines of particular religions. Students learn that the
earth is round, although a few religious sects still believe it is flat.
More important, teachers say that men and women of all races
should have equal opportunity, even though some religions
teach sharp gender differentiation or racial hierarchy. If the
bases for teaching facts or values do not lie primarily in religious
premises, teaching them does not become religious simply
because they conflict with some religious convictions.4 4
This rule against teaching religion turns curricular choices
that involve religion into constitutional issues to a much greater
degree than is true for any other subject. 45 The historical expla-
nation for this special treatment lies in the divisiveness of relig-
42. How much a teacher may reveal her own personal beliefs is an issue I
pass over here.
43. Someone might claim that the Bible is a source of historical truth,
whatever its religious status. And, indeed, so viewed, the Bible does support the
assertion that Israel had a king named David. But the Bible obviously does not
have that authority about the moment of the earth's creation.
44. I deal with these issues at somewhat greater length in an article enti-
tled Teaching About Religion, 19 J.L. & POL. (forthcoming Spring 2003).
45. Schools can take positions on many ideological issues, teaching that
liberal democracy is preferable to monarchy, for example; but their adoption of
certain political positions, say, supporting the Republican Party, would violate
the Free Speech Clause or the Constitution as a whole.
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ion in Western Europe and the American colonies; the modern
justification rests in the desirability for both religion and govern-
ment of the state's staying out of the business of teaching
religion.
A corollary of the rule that schools may not teach religious
propositions (although they may teach facts and values that con-
flict with some religious beliefs) is that educators and courts must
be ready to decide what count as religious propositions and what
it is to teach them. Nothing I say in this article is meant to sug-
gest that the answer to these questions will necessarily be simple
or that bright lines mark which propositions are religious; none-
theless a division must be made for constitutional purposes.
B. Domains of Science and Religion
How, if at all, do science and religion intersect? How far are
religious claims compatible with what science asserts about physi-
cal reality?
Some people believe that the domains of religion and sci-
ence do not overlap, that-as Stephen Jay Gould has put it-they
have "nonoverlapping magisteria," science dealing with facts
about the world, religion concerning itself with matters of the
spirit and morality.4 6 Few religious believers will be found within
the category of people who suppose that the domains have no
overlap. Religions typically include perspectives on human
nature that could coincide or conflict with what social scientists
assert. The idea that natural science does not overlap the domain
of religion is more widely appealing,47 but many religious believ-
ers think that a persuasive religious account of ultimate reality
bears on subjects to which natural science speaks.
Even if science and religion address subject matters that
overlap, we might escape any conflicts if science and religion are
separate discourses, having no relation to each other, or if what a
religion asserts is compatible with what science discovers.
The "separate discourses" approach founders on the reality
that scientists and religious believers both care about what is
really true, overall. Scientists often aspire to do more than offer
46. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, ROCKS OF AGES: SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE
FULLNESS OF LIFE (2001) [hereinafter ROCKS OF AGES]; Stephen Jay Gould,
Nonoverlapping Magisteria, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS,
supra note 15, at 737-49. Theorists differ about how exactly to characterize the
two domains.
47. McMullin, supra note 15, at 173, has suggested that the biblical story
requires certain suppositions about human nature, freedom, and moral respon-
sibility, but that the domain of conflict between religion and science is limited.
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theories that fit scientific criteria well.48 Whatever the status of
theories about unobservable quarks, evolutionists make claims
about aspects of reality-about a series of events in the history of
the earth.4 9 A scientific assertion that the earth is over four bil-
lion years old is like the assertion that I am more than sixty-five
years old. No one is foolish enough to claim that modern sci-
ence is the only source of truth, and it is controversial whether
scientific explanations could conceivably account for all of. truth;
but much of science, including evolutionary theory, does make
claims about reality.
What about religious believers? Some may take accounts of
physical reality and history in authoritative religious sources as
mythic and symbolic, on a plane of truth that varies from that of
science-this indeed is a version of the nonoverlapping domains
theory-but many religious persons take these accounts more lit-
erally. Most notably for this article, fundamentalists who believe
in the literal truth of Genesis have a view about how life really
developed that conflicts with evolutionary theory.
Although one cannot dismiss the possibility of a conflict
between scientific and religious perspectives, four understand-
ings common among traditional religions may be compatible
with scientific views. Two ways in which a Divine Creator might
relate to physical events do not pose any conflict. The first is that
a Creator created original matter and set things in motion
according to scientific laws that the Creator established. The sec-
ond is that the Creator continues to sustain the universe and life
within it, even when things run wholly in accord with scientific
principles.50 Were the Creator to abandon the universe, scien-
tific principles would cease to operate and life would end.
48. Dorothy Nelkin has written, "Scientists accept theories and teach
them, not because they represent 'truth,' but because they are accepted by the
scientific community as useful explanations of reality." NELIN, supra note 1, at
186.
49. Philip Kitcher, in Science, Truth, and Democracy, provides a persuasive
defense of scientific realism. PHILIP KITCHER, SCIENCE, TRUTH, AND DEMOCRACY
11-82 (2001). Heinz Pagels, in The Cosmic Code, wrote, "One could debate the
existential status of quarks for a long time." HEINZ PAGELS, THE COSMIC CODE
232 (1982).
50. These two possibilities may be viewed as aspects of traditional Chris-
tian faith. According to some passages in the antievolution literature, belief in
these two aspects of divine control might be sufficient to qualify one as a crea-
tionist. PhillipJohnson, for.example, in DARWIN ON TRIAL 113 (1991), says, "In
the broadest sense, a 'creationist' is simply a person who believes that the world
(and especially mankind) was designed, and exists for a purpose." One could
believe this and also believe that life's development has occurred as neo-Dar-
winian theory asserts. I am considering as creationist and intelligent design
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Each of these two possibilities could be realized despite the
universal operation of scientific principles. Further, science can-
not tell us whether either of these possibilities is realized.51 It
cannot explain how everything got started-it can tell us that a
Big Bang began the universe, perhaps it can tell us why the Big
Bang occurred, but it cannot tell us why there was any physical
matter to be the subject of the Big Bang.52 Similarly, science can-
not tell us whether everything we perceive is sustained by a Crea-
tive Spirit.
The relation between two other common religious ideas and
the findings of science is less straightforward. I mention them
here to put them aside for the remainder of this article. Many
religious people believe in a personal afterlife or reincarnation.
No existing scientific principles directly support these beliefs, and
many skeptics think that what science does establish suggests
strongly that death is the end of personal existence. But science
cannot rule out the possibility of an afterlife, and it is conceivable
that in a distant time, human beings will come to understand a
novel set of scientific principles that could explain stages of
living.
Another widely held conviction is that a Divine Spirit
inspires human understanding and behavior. Many people
believe that God's grace leads them to grasp religious truths and
act accordingly. As of now, scientific principles cannot explain
every aspect of individual human behavior. Generalizations yield
predictions about ranges of beliefs and actions among categories
of people; but rarely can anyone predict with great confidence
theories only those claims that to some degree, at least, conflict with a neo-
Darwinian account.
51. It might be said that claims about these two possibilities are meaning-
less, because they are not subject to empirical investigation. By definition, I
have said that they are not subject to scientific investigation. But their realiza-
tion is conceivable, and we might imagine confirmation in some kind of an after-
life in which personalities are able to grasp things beyond what human beings
on earth can perceive. More to the point, insofar as people now have a basis to
assess claims of religious truth, these claims about a Creative Spirit might fit
with a persuasive account of God's nature.
52. Conceivably, scientists might eventually be able to explain how origi-
nal matter was formed (see PAGELS, supra note 49, at 278, for the possibility that
"the universe itself sprang into existence out of nothingness-a gigantic vac-
uum fluctuation"); but I believe that at some point scientific explanations must
stop. Of course, a standard religious explanation suffers the same defect, in a
sense. It cannot tell us why there has been a Divine Creator. But this religious
explanation does seem to reach one step further back than can any scientific
explanation. And this reaching further back provides an assurance about the
significance of their own lives for many religious persons.
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just how a single person will behave;53 when such a prediction is
feasible, it usually reaches beyond ordinary scientific generaliza-
tions to personal insights not easily reduced to scientific laws.
This limitation may flow from our comparative ignorance; per-
haps a full understanding of how minute particles move would
tell us whether a particular man will undergo a conversion expe-
rience or become more generous or greedy as he ages. All I want
to claim here is that if a realm of individual choice and response
is not subject, even in theory, to a scientific explanation, then
belief that a Creator influences individual behavior to this degree
raises no potential conflict with scientific principles.54
C. All Sources of Truth
A person who believes that various sources of truth point in
different directions must evaluate all these sources to decide
where the truth probably lies. Almost no one denies that scien-
tific investigation is a source of truth, so few will reject all scien-
tific conclusions as withoutforce. Numbers of people, including
many scientists, do not believe in religious sources of truth;55
they will not consult any religious sources to decide what is
true. 6 But many people believe that scientific and religious
sources both provide insights into truth and that the two
domains overlap.57 What is such a person to believe when sci-
ence, taken alone, marks as most likely a reality different from
what religious sources she credits, taken alone, suggest?
Part of the ethos of science is that particular conclusions and
general theories are revisable in light of increases in evidence
and scientific understanding. Radical revisions have occurred in
the past, and presently dominant theories are continually quali-
fied. No one can believe that exactly the scientific theories now
prevailing are the final word of science. Still, certain conclusions
53. I do not speak here about a person's immediate reaction if his fingers
touch a hot frying pan. Certain human responses to direct physical stimuli are
virtually universal.
54. Needless to say, the person who thinks that science, at least in theory,
can explain all human actions cannot also concede that a Creator could influ-
ence belief and action in a manner that is inexplicable according to science.
55. Kenneth Miller says that over years of teaching in science he has
.come to realize that a presumption of atheism or agnosticism is universal in
academic life." MILLER, supra note 12, at 19.
56. I put aside their possible belief that atheism is true. Atheism, taken
alone, does not produce positive ideas about how the physical world operates.
57. These people typically believe that perfect scientific and perfect relig-
ious understanding will coincide-that is, they do not think that God has cre-
ated the natural world in a way to deceive our natural reason and test our
faith-but that present understandings are fallible.
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are so powerfully confirmed, their abandonment is extremely
unlikely. Hundreds of years ago, people did not realize that the
earth is round and that the blood of mammals circulates from
the heart. The scientific evidence for both these propositions is
overwhelming. That scientists will one day discover that the
earth is really flat or that our blood does not circulate is nearly
inconceivable. Part of the job of evaluating the weight to give to
a scientific conclusion is assessing its degree of confirmation.
Ideas of error and revisability in religion are a bit more com-
plicated. One may think that an authoritative source, such as the
Bible or church teachings, is itself in error, or that those inter-
preting the source may err. Alvin Plantinga, a prominent philos-
opher of religion and evangelical Protestant, has suggested that
the difficulty for Christians is discerning what message the Lord
is conveying in Scripture: "Scripture is inerrant: the Lord makes
no mistakes; what he proposes for our belief is what we ought to
believe. Sadly enough, however, our grasp of what he proposes
to teach is fallible. ' 58 One basis for rethinking what Scripture
conveys is whether existing interpretations conflict with well-
established conclusions of science. Nicholas Wolterstorff has
talked more broadly of an "authentic Christian commitment";
Christians have frequently revised their understanding of the
beliefs that such a commitment involves on the basis of accepted
scientific theories.59
We need to imagine a person who concludes that sound
religion and the best science suggest different conclusions about
a subject. Her review of competing conclusions, to see if they
seem valid on their own premises, 60 has not resolved the conflict,
and she wants to do more than suspend judgment. She has to
evaluate what seems most likely to be the truth overall-the sci-
entific conclusion or the religious one or some compromise
between them.6' Much will depend on the clarity and confi-
dence with which science or religion speaks. Many people will
not credit a religious conclusion that conflicts directly with a
58. Alvin Plantinga, When Faith and Reason Clash: Evolution and the Bible, in
INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 15, at 119.
59. NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, REASON WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF RELIGION
77, 88-90 (1976). Thus, Christians once thought that their religious commit-
ment entailed belief that the earth is the center of physical existence. They do
no longer.
60. If an initial religious conclusion is based on Scripture, for example, a
person might decide that Scripture should be read differently from some pre-
vailing view.
61. Plantinga, supra note 58, at 117-22.
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powerful scientific one, such as the roundness of the earth.6 2 But
if the evidence for the scientific conclusion is uncertain or weak,
or full of gaps, though nonetheless the best that science can now
do, and if the religious reasons for the competing conclusion are
very strong, a person may well adhere to the religious view,
believing that science will eventually revise its position. Inevita-
bly, people who take seriously both religious and scientific under-
standings and think they can conflict over certain domains will
sometimes, in their overall search for truth, credit a powerful relig-
ious conviction over a weakly supported and tentative scientific
conclusion.
The attitudes of some religious critics of evolutionary theory
are illustrative.63 They believe that if one gave no credence to
the existence of a Divine Creator, the neo-Darwinian explana-
tion, as uncertain as it may be, would be the best we could do to
explain the origins of life. But when one considers a Divine Cre-
ator, another explanation, involving God's creative action, seems
much more likely.
For a person who believes that science and religion are both
sources of truth,64 the probability that a scientific conclusion is,
overall, true may depend partly on what one thinks is persuasive
from a religious perspective. At its most obvious, this reality is
played out in strong religious arguments that evolutionary theory
conflicts with the Genesis account or is otherwise at odds with
how a Divine Creator would act. Such arguments are countered
by religious arguments that a Creator would be likely to create a
universe with "functional integrity," not intervening from time to
time to violate its natural laws,65 and that evolution, in all its con-
tingency, fits well with a dynamic creation in which new life
62. There is a certain asymmetry in how one regards the source that
"loses out" in the final evaluation. If one thinks the scientific source is more
reliable, one is likely to reinterpret the religious source not to assert seriously
what science denies, e.g., that the earth is flat. If one credits the religious
source, one may look at the competing science more skeptically, but one can-
not simply produce a different scientific conclusion without the evidence on
which science relies.
63. See Plantinga, supra note 58, 136-39.
64. Indeed, the conflict can arise even if one is not confident that relig-
ious sources are ever sound, so long as one thinks there is a substantial likeli-
hood they are.
65. Howard J. Van Till, Mhen Faith and Reason Cooperate, in INTELLIGENT
DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 15, at 158-59. 1 do not distin-
guish here between religious arguments and arguments of religious philosophy.
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comes into being through natural processes and human beings
enjoy true freedom.66
The examination of religious understanding also has more
interesting twists. Evolutionary theorists from Darwin forward
have employed an argument from imperfection. When we look
at animals as they now are, we cannot imagine that this is how a
Divine Creator, acting directly with each kind of animal, would
have created them. Stephen Jay Gould has highlighted the
panda's thumb, which is not like other digits in structure but
which functions moderately well.67 The explanation for its devel-
opment must be the historical link of modern pandas with prior
species, not the hand of God. Another author suggests that an
even more powerful example is the laryngeal nerve in mammals,
which is much longer than would be ideal and reaches a ridicu-
lous length in giraffes.68
Why should we assume that a Divine Creator's standards for
good design are ours? Of course, the Creator might be whimsi-
cal or malicious, or less than omnipotent, but perhaps evolution-
ists may reasonably take as their standard for comparison the
idea of a benign, omnipotent Creator that has dominated West-
ern religious thought. Even so, the creationist can answer that
we may not know all the Creator's purposes, and apparent
"imperfection" in one animal may somehow contribute to an
overall perfection.69 To this, the evolutionist may rejoin that
unless we assume that the Creator's purposes are knowable to
some degree, all religious arguments are doomed to failure; if we
can discern such purposes, it is hard to understand why a Creator
would choose to give mammals such an inefficiently long laryn-
geal nerve.7 °
66. Arthur Peacocke, Welcoming the "Disguised Friend"--Darwinism and
Divinity, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 15, at
472-81; see also MILLER, supra note 12, at 270-75.
67. See Stephen Jay Gould, The Panda's Thumb, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN
CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 15, at 669-76.
68. Kelly C. Smith, Appealing to Ignorance Behind the Cloak of Ambiguity, in
INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 15, at 724-25:
Consider the bizarre fact that, in mammals, the recurrent laryngeal
nerve does not travel straight from the cranium to the larynx. Rather,
it travels down the neck to the chest, where it loops around a pulmo-
nary ligament and then travels back up the neck to the larynx. In ani-
mals like the giraffe, this can mean a twenty-foot length of nerve where
twelve inches or so would suffice.
Id.
69. Paul A. Nelson, The Role of Theology in Current Evolutionary Reasoning, in
INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 15, at 688-89.
70. Smith, supra note 68, at 708-13, 723-24.
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So the argument goes. What we can quickly grasp is that in
this debate over the scientific theory of evolution, we are drawn
deeply into theological and philosophical arguments about what
a Divine Creator would or would not do if that Creator created
individual kinds of animals directly, arguments that are not sub-
ject to scientific confirmation or disconfirmation. Such argu-
ments are unavoidable, so long as our interest is in what is true
overall, and scientific and religious conclusions are in potential
competition; but they raise perplexities when we get to the sub-
ject matter of science courses and the teaching of religion.7"
D. Methodological Naturalism
Thus far, I have implicitly assumed a central characteristic of
modern science, that it is methodologically naturalist-
approaching scientific problems on the assumption that physical
events have natural causes and can be explained according to
uniform laws that need not refer to any supernatural forces.
Here are two formulations of this central idea. "The method-
ological naturalist is the person who assumes that the world runs
according to unbroken law; . . . and that science involves just
such understanding without any reference to extra or supernatu-
ral forces like God."
72
[W]hen it comes to unraveling scientific problems, most
practicing scientists, regardless of their religious beliefs,
refuse to invoke the existence of unknown supernatural
forces-even in the absence of known naturalistic mecha-
nisms. This suspended judgment is accompanied by the
hope that human minds will eventually find a crack in the
apparently impenetrable surface of the mystery.7"
Methodological naturalism has thus far proven very productive;
scientists have discovered natural explanations for countless phe-
nomena not previously explicable according to scientific
principles.7 4
71. 1 will conclude that these arguments may be presented, but should not
be endorsed or delved into too deeply.
72. Michael Ruse, Methodological Naturalism Under Attack, in INTELaIGENT
DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 15, at 365.
73. MatthewJ. Brauer & Daniel R. Brumbaugh, Biology Remystified: The Sci-
entific Claims of the New Creationists, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS
CRITICS, supra note 15, at 325.
74. Ruse, supra note 72, at 377, writes that "in the past, the methodologi-
cally naturalist approach yielded fantastic dividends." See also Robert T. Pen-
nock, Naturalism, Evidence, and Creationism: The Case of Phillip Johnson, in
INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 15, 90-92.
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Although it is sometimes suggested that most scientists are
committed to a more far-reaching naturalism, one that denies
the existence of any supernatural reality,75 a modern scientist, as
such, is committed only to methodological naturalism. She need
not deny either that God sustains natural laws or that science
may prove unable to explain some physical phenomena.
Science has not always been committed to methodological
naturalism, and it conceivably could move away from that posi-
tion in the future. Alvin Plantinga, among others, has argued
that Christian scientists should abandon methodological natural-
ism in favor of "theistic science" or "Augustinian" science.76
Others have rejected this proposal as unwise, both because it sub-
stitutes a science for Christians as contrasted with a science based
on a shared, universal methodology, 77 and because it might
abandon techniques of scientific investigation and empirical con-
firmation that have proven so valuable in the past.
78
Just how radical is the proposal of "theistic science"? Were
the suggestion only that scientists who are Christians should eval-
uate conclusions reached by methodological naturalism against
their religious understandings before they make claims about
what is true overall,79 it would be relatively modest.8" If the sug-
75. See Phillip E. Johnson, Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of Religion,
in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 15, at 72: "The
problem with scientific naturalism as a worldview is that it takes a sound meth-
odological premise of natural science and transforms it into a dogmatic state-
ment about the nature of the universe." Pennock has criticized Johnson's
failure clearly to distinguish methodological naturalism from ontological natu-
ralism. Pennock, supra note 74, at 78-84.
76. Plantinga, supra note 58, at 139-41; Plantinga, Methodological Natural-
ism?, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 15, at
355-56. See also Phillip Johnson's support of "theistic realism," in PHILLIP
JOHNSON, REASON IN THE BALANCE 107 (1995), and Nicholas Wolterstorff's asser-
tion in WOLTERSTORF, supra note 59, at 77, that "one's authentic Christian com-
mitment ought to function internally to scholarship."
77. McMullin, supra note 15, at 167-68. Pennock comments, "Such a bal-
kanized science is at one with radical multiculturalists' calls for feminist science
or Hispanic mathematics." PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 212.
78. See Ruse, supra note 72, at 377-78. At a panel discussion at the Uni-
versity of Virginia on April 10, 2002, it was suggested that science requires meth-
odological naturalism, that whatever people in the future might call science, we
should not acknowledge that anything that is not naturalist is really science.
Evolution and Creationism, Science and Belief, Panel Discussion at the Univer-
sity of Virginia (Apr. 10, 2002).
79. In one place, Plantinga talks of scientists beginning with ordinary
(Duhemian) science, with theists incorporating that science "into a fuller con-
text" that includes their religious principles. Plantinga, supra note 76, at 355.
80. That most modern science is carried on jointly by many researchers,
with different philosophical opinions, would pose a practical problem.
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gestion included some reference by theists to their religious
understandings when they choose research agendas, it would still
be relatively modest. For example, a scientist who is a Christian
could choose to investigate matters that might not yield to a nat-
uralistic explanation, rather than filling in details of how natural
selection produces viruses that resist antibiotics. But if "theistic
science" were meant to include some different way of doing sci-
ence, some significantly different mode of investigation and
drawing conclusions, following the proposal would involve a cru-
cial shift. Thus far, we have been given little concrete sense of
what such a different approach might be; and it is doubtful
whether many research programs developed in accord with it
would prove as productive as those framed by methodological
naturalists.
E. Scientific Conclusions and the Truth of Religious Propositions
Committed as it is to methodological naturalism, science
may yield particular conclusions, and even theories, that bear on
the truth of religious propositions. Most obviously, science may
establish facts that are directly contrary to religious propositions.
Thus, anyone who accepts the scientific view that the sun is at the
center of our planetary system cannot also believe a religious pro-
position that God made the sun to circle the earth.
Scientific conclusions can threaten more fundamental relig-
ious propositions less directly. A number of prominent evolu-
tionists have thought that the truth of evolution counts strongly
against the possibility of a benign Creator.8' We have reviewed
the argument of imperfection against the possibility that God
directly created all kinds of animals. But a related argument tells
against the existence of any Divine Creator who is omnipotent
and benign. Why would such a Creator have brought forth natu-
ral laws that produce imperfect life through the painful and arbi-
trary process of natural selection?
This question is, indeed, troubling for religious believers
who accept the evolutionary story, but it is hardly novel. To any-
81. Among the more notable arguments of this kind is that in DAWK1NS,
supra note 12. Given the complex machinery of life, Dawkins has said, "I could
not imagine being an atheist at any time before 1859 ...." Id. at 5. "Darwin
made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist." Id. at 6. Dawkins subse-
quently calls the idea of a Divine Creator, as an explanation of complex life, a
"feeble," "self-defeating" argument, because it does not explain the origin of
the complex Designer. Id. at 141. The force of this critique does not seem to
depend on the advent of Darwinian theory. Dawkins does not tell us why he
would have been unable to recognize the argument for a Divine Creator as
feeble and self-defeating before 1859.
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one who has paid the slightest attention, natural existence is full
of conflict, pain, and death. Christians have always found natural
evil hard to explain, 82 and many (including myself) believe it is
beyond explaining. Trying to square the evolutionary process
with a benign Creator is a particular variant of the pervasive
problem of natural evil.83
In any event, when some scientists assert that evolutionary
theory supports atheism or warrants strong skepticism about
traditional religious views, they stray beyond the strict bounds of
methodological naturalism; but we must understand that when-
ever scientific conclusions have a strong probability of being true
overall, this can affect not only the likely truth of narrow relig-
ious doctrines that are directly opposed to the scientific conclu-
sions, but also the persuasiveness of other, more basic, religious
conceptions.
Science may also provide a kind of positive support for relig-
ious propositions. Although the "Big Bang" theory of the origin
of the universe can hardly be called evidence for God, some the-
orists do think the theory fits more congenially than the once
popular "steady state" theory with belief in a God who creates ex
nihilo.
And scientific experiments can relate more sharply to relig-
ious beliefs. Part of science is establishing the existence of things
that science cannot yet explain. These phenomena may possibly
point to a supernatural power. In a recent study of intercessory
prayer, the subjects of the experiment were 199 women in Korea
82. Evils caused by human actions can plausibly be attributed to a free-
dom of choice given human beings. Although some have said human sin is also
responsible for natural evil, the connection is much less obvious and natural evil
existed long before human beings appeared on earth, if evolutionists are right
about history.
83. Darwin wrote in a letter quoted in PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 70: "This
very old argument from the existence of suffering against the existence of an
intelligent first cause seems to me a strong one; whereas ... the presence of
suffering agrees well with the view that all organic beings have developed
through variation and natural selection."
Arthur Peacocke, in defending the consonancy of evolution with a Chris-
tian view, explicitly addresses the problem of natural evil:
Hence pain, suffering and death, which have been called 'natural
evil'-the features of existence inimical to biological life, in general,
and human flourishing, in particular-appear to be inevitable con-
comitants of a universe that is going to be creative of new forms, some
of which are going to be conscious and self-conscious.
Peacocke, supra note 66, at 481.
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who sought assistance at a fertility clinic to become pregnant."
They received identical medical procedures-in vitro fertilization
and embryo transfer. American researchers did not inform
either the women or the medical personnel assisting them that
they were engaging in a prayer experiment. Groups in the
United States, Canada, and Australia, with pictures of the women
for whom they prayed, prayed for half the women. Other groups
prayed that these prayers might be effective. The researchers
expected that prayers by strangers would be shown to be useless.
To their surprise, the rate of pregnancy for women who were
beneficiaries of prayers was 50%-"an amazingly high success
rate for any fertility program"; the pregnancy rate for the control
group was 25%. Of course, the experiment may have been ill-
designed; it may prove not replicable by other experiments; the
results may have been an astonishing coincidence. If the results
are further confirmed by similar experiments, scientists may one
day discover a kind of mental communication that affects physi-
cal processes that is subject to a natural explanation. Nonethe-
less, the experiment would lead an uncommitted observer to
believe it more likely than he did before the experiment that a
supernatural being or force responds to prayer.
Scientific methods may also be used to test a tentative relig-
ious explanation for a singular event. Someone has enjoyed a
startling recovery from physical affliction. If doctors who investi-
gate to find a possible natural explanation begin with doubt that
any such explanation may suffice, their inquiry follows the stric-
tures of methodological naturalism only in a sense. The investi-
gators do try to determine if they can explain what has occurred
naturally, but they do not assume that such an explanation will
work. (An attempt to replicate the prayer experiment would be
similar in this respect if undertaken by people who think inter-
cessory prayer is probably successful and lacks any natural expla-
nation.) Whether an investigation is scientific should not
depend on the investigators' attitudes about the likelihood of
success in finding natural causes; two researchers who shared a
conviction about what would constitute a successful scientific
explanation might commence with contrasting assumptions
about whether they will find one. A scientist could address ques-
tions about the limits of natural evolutionary explanations with
the same attitude that is brought to claims of miracles by investi-
gators who credit the possibility of miracles, but also know that
84. Sheila Anne Feeney, Is Prayer Good Medicine? MEDSCAPE HEALTH, Feb.
8, 2002; see also Eric Nagourney, A Study Links Prayer and Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 2001, at F6; Jim Holt, Prayer Works, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, at 92.
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many events believed to be miraculous may have been caused
naturally.
VI. MIRACLES
Before returning to the debate about evolutionary theory
and creationism, I focus briefly on miracles. The question
whether miracles occur connects closely to the question whether
God answers prayers and bears more obliquely on assertions that
a Creator has intervened in the development of life. Like claims
that God created each kind of animal and plant, claims of mira-
cles rest on a belief that God transcends or violates ordinary prin-
ciples of natural processes. One argument for special creation is
that a God who performs miracles might well also have directly
created life,8 5 though some theorists contend that God's per-
forming "miracles" as an aspect of the "salvation" history of
human beings is radically different from God's transcending nat-
ural principles many millions of years before humans existed."6
Claimed miracles also matter, as we have seen, as one locus of
"scientific" investigations that may conclude that no natural
explanation of a phenomenon will suffice.
Individual miraculous events, at odds with scientific laws, are
certainly conceivable,8 7 and science cannot establish that miracles
do not occur, because science cannot prove that every physical
event occurs in accord with natural principles. Many scientists
believe that the operations of scientific principles have no excep-
tions; if apparent events seem to contradict scientific principles,
the events have not occurred, or a full account of the facts would
show how science can explain them, or accepted scientific princi-
ples require emendation or qualification. Take mental telepa-
thy. We hear stories about people intuitively realizing that loved
ones have suffered tragedies or faced great danger. One can, of
course, take the tough line and believe that all such stories are
bogus or narrate purely coincidental connections of perception
with actual tragedy or danger. Or one might assume that at some
85. Plantinga, supra note 58, at 130-31.
86. McMullin, supra note 15, at 185-89. The basic idea is that the reasons
for God to perform miracles within the stream of human history do not apply to
the development of life.
87. Could someone claim, to the contrary, that miracles are conceptually
impossible? The argument might run that there must be some explanation for
what happens, that the explanation could be understood by human beings, and
that therefore nothing miraculous could occur. The argument misses the point
that not every explanation need be scientific. If the "explanation" for an event
is that a Divine Being chose to intervene in earthly affairs in a manner that
violated scientific principles, that would not constitute a scientific explanation.
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distant time, science will be able to explain how human minds
can communicate in the absence of hearing and seeing.8 (Such
an explanation might also cover the success of intercessory
prayer.) Neither of these stances deviates from the conviction
that science can, in theory, explain everything that occurs within
the domains to which science speaks.
But what are we to make of miracles of the sort described in
the Jewish Bible (e.g., the parting of the Red Sea) and in the New
Testament (e.g.,Jesus' raising of Lazarus from the dead) and mir-
acles claimed to be authenticated by modern inquiry into medi-
cal cures attributed to divine intervention? A common skeptical
response is that the events did not take place-either the story of
Lazarus is mythical, or Lazarus had not really died. Does anyone
say, 'Yes, Lazarus did really die, remained dead for a few days,
and was then raised to life by Jesus, but science will one day be
able to explain just what happened."?
That miracles occur is affirmed by many religious faiths; 9 in
a Newsweek poll, eighty-four percent of adult Americans said they
thought God performed miracles, and nearly half said they had
personally experienced or witnessed a miracle.9" The Jewish
88. Discussing an experiment that was undertaken to show that one could
not accept both the objectivity of the microworld and the principle of local
causality, Heinz Pagels remarked, "Some recent popularizers of Bell's work...
have gone on to claim that telepathy is verified or the mystical notion that all
parts of the universe are instantaneously interconnected is vindicated .... That
is rubbish." PAGE", supra note 49, at 174; see alsoJohn Polkinghorne, The Quan-
tum World, in ROBERT PHYSICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND THEOLOGY: A COMMON QUEST
FOR UNDERSTANDING 333, 340-41 (J. Russell et al. eds., 1988) (discussing "The
Non-Consequences of Quantum Theory").
Richard Dawkins takes what I call the tough line, remarking on "coinci-
dences that give us an eerie spine-tingling feeling, like dreaming of a particular
person for the first time in decades, then waking up to find that they died in the
night." DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 161. What "we commonly call miracles" are
"part of a spectrum of more-or-less improbable natural events." Id. at 139.
89. See generally KENNETH L. WOODWARD, THE BOOK OF MIRACLES: THE
MEANING OF MIRACLE STORIES IN CHRISTIANITY, JUDAISM, BUDDHISM, HINDUISM,
ISLAM (2000). In his introduction, Woodward defines a miracle as:
[A] n unusual or extraordinary event that is in principle perceivable by
others, that finds no ordinary explanation in reasonable human abili-
ties or in other known forces that operate in the world of time and
space, and that is the result of a special act of God or the gods or of
human beings transformed by efforts of their own through asceticism
and meditation.
Id. at 28.
90. Kenneth L. Woodward, What Miracles Mean, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 2000,
at 54. Since different individuals have different implicit understandings of what
"miracles" are and what occurrences exemplify them, we cannot be confident
what percentage of people believe in miracles, defined in any single precise
way.
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Bible and the New Testament report many miraculous interven-
tions in natural processes. Some Christians take these stories
with a large grain of salt, and others do not believe miracles have
occurred since biblical times; but many Protestants believe in
miraculous cures, and the Roman Catholic Church is officially
committed to miraculous occurrences. Of course, events of this
sort that natural science cannot explain might be caused by a
devil or powerful aliens from outer space, rather than God.
Non-Catholics may be surprised to discover just how rigor-
ous the Church is about distinguishing the unusual but possibly
explicable from the truly miraculous. A person can be beatified
only if a miracle has been performed when someone invokes his
or her assistance (usually by prayer). A further miracle is needed
after beatification if the person is to be canonized as a saint. The
Congregation for the Causes of Saints has a body of medical con-
sultants who must "determine that the extraordinary healing-
these days virtually all accepted miracles are medical cures-is
inexplicable by science.""' Members of the Consulta Medica, dis-
tinguished doctors, review the medical records of the person
whose cure is claimed to be miraculous, as well as the written
testimony of witnesses and other scientific evidence. The cure
must be complete and lasting, and "inexplicable by all known
scientific means."92 To qualify, the cure must not be of any can-
cer that has a substantial rate of spontaneous remission, nor can
it be of a mental disorder. The doctors themselves do not decide
that a cure is miraculous, only that it is scientifically inexplicable;
the decision whether a miracle has taken place is left to theologi-
cal consultants, to the Congregation, and finally to the Pope.93
A similar process is employed by local and international
medical bureaus that certify cures at the Grotto of Lourdes. To
qualify, a cure must be "certain, definitive and medically inexplic-
able;"94 a Canonical Commission formed by the Bishop where
the cured person lives determines whether the cure comes from
God.95 In the sixty-three years since church authorities have offi-
cially recognized extraordinary cures or healings at Lourdes,
91. KENNETH L. WOODWARD, MAKING SAINTS: How THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
DETERMINES WHO BECOMES A SAINT, WHO DOESN'T, AND WHY 192 (1990).
92. Id. at 195.
93. Id. at 205-06.
94. Lourdes Sanctuary lists the criteria for a cure on its web-site at http://
www.lourdesfrance.org/gb/gbsbOO27.htm, § I (last visited on Feb. 9, 2003) (on file
with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
95. Id. § I.
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sixty-six have been proclaimed miraculous" 6-the latest, a man
who was suddenly and completely cured after having been
brought to Lourdes on a stretcher paralyzed with multiple
sclerosis.97
Here is what Dr. Raffiello Cortesini, who was head of the
Consulta Medica of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints,
said about his experience:
There is skepticism about miracles, I know, even in the
Catholic Church. I myself, if I did not do these consulta-
tions, would never believe what I read. You don't under-
stand how fantastic, how incredible-and how well-
documented-these cases are. They are more incredible
than historical romances. Science fiction is nothing by
comparison.
98
Someone might reject claims of miracles on the general
ground that a powerful Creator would never choose to violate
the principles by which the Creator constituted the universe.
This argument is religious, not scientific, and it is weak. The
argument is religious because it adopts a religious perspective to
suggest that the Creator would not violate the Creator's own laws,
as it were. The argument is weak because we can imagine why a
Creator might choose to establish physical relations that are sub-
ject to uniform scientific principles and yet, on occasion, act con-
trary to those principles. To take an example at the heart of
traditional Christian belief, by raising Jesus from the dead, God
marked his special status and confirmed the hope of life after
death. Christians have tended to see miracles as signs of God's
grace and love, and the Catholic Church has a developed theol-
ogy about miracles that follow the intercessions of holy men and
women. Believing that miracles occur is certainly not
incoherent.
Although science cannot prove that miracles never happen,
advances in science can make miracles seem less likely. Centu-
ries ago, people thought that many events were miraculous which
are now subject to scientific explanations. As science explains
more and more events that have seemed miraculous, a person
might reasonably conclude that no events are really at odds with
accurate scientific principles. But science alone cannot yield a
decisive answer about miracles; a full evaluation reaches beyond
96. Miracles as "Signs of Christ", MARIAN LiB. NEWSL., Summer 1999, at
http://www.udayton.edu/may/respub/summer99.html, 10 (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
97. Id. 1 1-2.
98. WOODWARD, supra note 91, at 200.
20031
350 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
science into the realm of persuasiveness from a religious point of
view. From the religious perspective, the reasons for and against
miraculous interventions in human history look significantly dif-
ferent from the reasons for and against creative intervention in
natural processes of developing forms of life.
A modern view of science that introduces indeterminism
may seem to pose a problem for miracles in a rather different
direction. According to Heinz Pagels, "quantum theory .. .
maintains that fundamental atomic processes occur at random
.... "" This has "destroyed the deterministic world view," imply-
ing "the existence of physical events that were forever unknow-
able and unpredictable."' 00 Does this mean that physical events
are only more probable or less probable, never impossible
according to scientific principles? 1 '
It is hard to know exactly how to take this element of inde-
terminism in the microworld. I think it has no relevance to many
events in the macroworld. °2 Random movements of small parti-
cles will not cause a small mouse to give birth to an adult human
being, water to turn into wine, or a paralyzing case of multiple
sclerosis to vanish in an instant.
Suppose I am wrong, that all we can strictly say scientifically
is that the chance of these occurrences is extremely slight. Could
we then conclude that if they do occur, they conform with scien-
tific principles and are not miraculous? I believe not. The scien-
tific principle is that the movement of the smallest particles is
random. If the probability of a large amount of water turning
into wine is infinitesimally small, less than one in many billion,
billion, billion instances of water, we may think it more likely that
if water does become wine, the cause is divine intervention rather
than random movements of small particles. Thus, even if indeter-
minism and probability infect all scientific judgments about par-
ticular occurrences, room remains for belief in miracles
99. PAGELS, supra note 49, at 23.
100. Id. at 64, 86. "[T]here is no absolute certainty for events" if one
includes the "time of occurrence and the energy change." Id. at 117. Pagels
wrote that a subquantum determinist theory is impossible according to quan-
tum theory. Id. at 86. However, it seems hard to be confident about what scien-
tists might discover in the future.
101. Richard Dawkins suggests that science would classify "a marble
statue of the Virgin Mary suddenly wav[ing] its hand at us" as "very improbable"
but not "utterly impossible." DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 159.
102. Pagels noted that quantum indeterminacy can affect our lives, as
with certain kinds of computer errors, but that the amount of uncertainty quan-
tum theory introduces for a flying tennis ball is one part in 10-3 . PAGELS, supra
note 49, at 148, 90.
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understood as events that do not conform with scientific
principles. 1
0 3
For our purposes, individual miracles matter mainly as they
bear on the likelihood of divine interventions or directions in the
processes of developing life. We might regard these interven-
tions, if they occurred, as large-scale miracles, although how they
might relate to scientific principles may be more complex than
the term "miracles" captures. Let us suppose that the neo-Dar-
winism synthesis fails to explain everything about the develop-
ment of complex life. If what is left will never be explicable by
science, it could represent a series of large-scale miracles. On
the other hand, were scientists one day to discover new explana-
tory principles, science might fill present gaps.'0 4 Yet another
possibility is that certain developments would be neither explica-
ble by scientific principles nor at odds with them, occurring in a
manner that science simply does not cover, or leaves open. One
suggestion along these lines is that the indeterminacy of the
movements of the smallest particles is ontological as well as epis-
temological, 10 5 and that a Creator's moving of a particle in any
particular direction would neither violate scientific principles
nor be explicable by them. A Creator moving enough particles
in this way could achieve extraordinary physical outcomes. In my
view, such outcomes would not only be strikingly improbable
according to scientific principles, they would violate the principle
that the movements of particles are random; °6 but the example at
least alerts us to the possibility of a conceptual space between
physical events that conform with principles of science and those
that violate these principles.
VII. SCIENCE AND MATERIAL FOR SCIENCE COURSES
A careful evaluation of the place of evolution, creationism,
and intelligent design in public schools requires matching the
specific claims and methodological foundations of the three
103. One reasonable response to claimed miracles is that either (1) they
are subject to scientific principles we do not yet understand-perhaps many
astonishing medical cures concern yet undiscovered connections of mind and
body-or (2) they did not occur-as with turning water into wine or raising the
dead.
104. Although these new principles would not themselves establish a
Divine Creator, they might seem to make a Creator's existence more likely.
105. See RobertJohn Russell, Does the "God Who Acts" Really Act in Nature?,
in SCIENCE AND THEOLOcY 77-102 (Ted Peters ed., 1998).
106. This possibility suggests that the line may be thin between outcomes
that "violate" scientific laws-miracles-and outcomes that involve actions that
scientific principles leave open. My opinion that a Creator's movement of parti-
cles would violate a scientific principle of randomness may be arguable.
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approaches against an analysis of what belongs in a science
course and what counts as teaching religion.
Educators need to evaluate whether any theory about the
development of life is "scientific," or nevertheless closely enough
related to science to belong in a science course, and whether,
from a scientific standpoint, the theory is minimally plausible. If
any theory is not adequately scientific or is not minimally plausi-
ble from a scientific perspective, it should not be taught as
science.
A. Minimum Plausibility
The notion of minimum plausibility is more straightforward
than the boundaries of science, so I shall begin with it. Although
I am not well equipped to judge the plausibility of scientific
claims, 10 7 my appraisals are nevertheless worth stating. If anyone
is to try to figure out what is true overall, he will have to engage a
field in which he is not expert.10 8 Further, many officials with
educational authority and virtually all of the judges who must dis-
cern if educational decisions are sufficiently grounded to pass
constitutional muster will be lay persons like myself, without spe-
cial expertise in the relevant physical sciences or in the philoso-
phy of science.
Jeffrie Murphy says that scientific creationists regard their
account as "literally true" and as "a highly confirmed scientific
hypothesis."" 9 He goes on,
To say that it is a scientific hypothesis is to say that it is the
sort of claim that can be established (or refuted) on the
basis of empirical evidence. 110 To say that it is a highly
confirmed hypothesis is to say that, given the evidence
available to us, it is the most reasonable hypothesis to hold
concerning the origin of the universe and life."1
107. What strikes me as reasonable may be understood by those more
expert as wildly implausible. (Most legal arguments can be made comprehensi-
ble to lay people, but nonlawyers may have little sense which of two positions
has more legal strength.)
108. See Alvin Plantinga, Evolution, Neutrality, and Antecedent Probability: A
Reply to McMullin and Van Till, in INrELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS
CRITICS, supra note 15, at 212-13. Of course, someone who is both biologist
and theologian need not stray from a field in which he is expert to discuss
evolution and creationism, but the rest of us cannot rely completely on the very
few people who happen to be expert in both domains.
109. MuRPHY, supra note 1, at 34.
110. Presumably, the empirical evidence must be of the sort that others
can confirm. In this sense, an experience of one's life being transformed is not
relevant empirical evidence for the existence of God.
111. MuRHY, supra note 1, at 35.
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Murphy remarks that some creationists claim only that their the-
ory is as reasonable as the theory of evolution.
If evolution and creationism were both scientific theories
and were about equally plausible from a scientific point of view,
teaching them both in biology courses as alternative approaches
would make sense. Years ago, scientists were about equally
divided between "Big Bang" and "steady state" theories of the
universe; these were properly taught as alternatives.
A theory might qualify as "scientific," in the sense of relying
on scientific evidence, but have almost no plausibility as possibly
accurate science. The theory that the sun moves around the
earth may once have been reputable from the scientific point of
view. It is no longer. Probably this is now the case with the
steady state theory of the universe, the Big Bang theory having
been very widely accepted.
Science teachers, and textbook authors, should not present
highly implausible scientific theories as having a substantial
probability of being accurate from a scientific point of view. A
teacher discussing the history of a scientific discipline may, of
course, comment on theories overtaken by time, and a teacher
may also illustrate the power of a dominant theory by comparing
it to rejected competitors, but teachers should not present highly
implausible theories as possibly convincing, leaving students to
make up their own minds. Through high school and in intro-
ductory university courses, students will usually not have the
capacity to weigh all the empirical evidence and arguments
themselves. To warrant its being presented as possibly accurate,
a theory should pass a threshold of plausibility.'
1 2
Someone might object to what I have said so far on the fol-
lowing ground: It is in the nature of scientific theories to be revis-
able. The most dominant, universally held theories-Newton's
theory is the leading example-have later been superceded or
abandoned. If no scientific theory has a secure claim to being
true, what now seems to be a highly implausible theory may turn
out to be accurate.
This objection misconceives the import of revisability in sci-
ence. Much of the point of science is reliance on empirical evi-
dence. Although dominant theories are qualified or give way
completely, that does not mean that every conceivable alternative
is plausible or deserves equal consideration. The likelihood that
further scientific advances will show that the earth is flat or the
center of the solar system, or that blood does not circulate in the
112. It need not necessarily be as persuasive as a competitor, but it needs
to be somewhat persuasive.
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bodies of mammals, is extremely slight. Science teachers should
give students a sense of the relative certainty of various theories,
insofar as scientists can now estimate that, but they should not
present what seem to be extremely implausible alternatives.
Research scientists within the fields that count overwhelm-
ingly accept evolution as the most convincing scientific theory
about the development of species. Although some elements of
the theory are more certainly true than others, scientific evi-
dence from various branches of science helps to support all of
the crucial aspects. If any theory of development of species quali-
fies as plausible, evolution does so.
Certain objections to evolutionary theory turn out to be mis-
conceived or not to be very substantial. The theory does not
assume "progress," but merely the continuing adjustment of
organisms to changing environmental conditions, and it does not
assume that mutations are generally beneficial or harmful." 3
Some creationists have claimed that the Second Law of Thermo-
dynamics, that systems increase entropy or disorder, is at odds
with evolutionary theory; but this law applies only to closed sys-
tems, whereas the development of life on earth is an open system
with new energy continually supplied by the sun." 4
A criticism that is sometimes made of evolutionary theory is
that the idea of natural selection is essentially circular, able to
"explain" any evidence that is forthcoming."15 The theory would
be circular in this way if it were unable to predict any changes
and it declared that the survival of a characteristic proves that the
characteristic was fitted for survival-however difficult it may be
for us to see that the characteristic is competitively advanta-
geous-or that the characteristic flows from a gene that confers a
competitive advantage in some other respect." 6 The theory
should not be understood as circular in this way.' With exam-
113. KITCHER, supra note 2, at 72, 98.
114. Id. at 91-92.
115. As Robert Pennock explains, the famous philosopher of science Karl
Popper once expressed this view but later abandoned it. PENNOCK, supra note
2, at 99-100.
116. Stuart Kauffman writes, "Many biologists think that Darwin's theory
explains but only weakly predicts." STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNI-
VERSE 16 (1995). Kitcher indicates how the recessive gene that produces sickle-
cell anemia survives because the same gene protects against some forms of
malaria. KITCHER, supra note 2, at 21.
117. The theory of descent of complex life from simple common ances-
tors is more easily subject to disconfirmation. If fossils showed that animals that
must have appeared later, according to the theory, actually appeared earlier,
that would be a serious blow to the theory. Dawkins writes, "If a single, well-
verified mammal skull were to turn up in 500 million year-old rocks, our whole
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pies like the peppered moth, we can clearly see that organisms
better suited to survive in the environment do survive and pass
on their characteristics to descendants. And scientists can pre-
dict that over generations viruses will develop resistance to antibi-
otics, as a theory of natural selection would indicate. In fact, no
one denies that natural selection can occur within species.
Although no single example can prove or disprove that natural
selection largely explains development from one species to
another, and evolutionists typically offer only educated guesses
about why any particular change occurred as it did millions of
years ago, nonetheless the cumulation of pieces of evidence can
suggest that natural selection is more or less convincing as an
explanation for developments. 18
B. Negative Arguments
Both Genesis creationists and proponents of intelligent
design present various negative arguments against the plausibility
of evolutionary theory. In addition to disagreement about the
strength of particular arguments, there is confusion (or obfusca-
tion) about the status of such arguments in general. Do negative
arguments have force? Do they support a competing theory?
Can opponents of a theory rely on disagreements among its pro-
ponents? What relevance have probabilistic estimates?
Negative arguments about an opposing position clearly are
one proper part of a defense of one's own position; this is no less
true in science than other disciplines. Creationists have com-
plained that evolutionists arbitrarily rule their negative argu-
ments out of bounds.' 19 And, indeed, various assertions that
modern theory of evolution would be utterly destroyed." DAWKINS, supra note
12, at 225. This remark is in some tension with the idea that scientific theories
can accommodate anomalies and with the idea that scientists do not and should
not abandon theories until more persuasive competitors are offered. See infra
note 120.
118. Philip Kitcher writes,
[P] hilosophers of science have shown how the refutation of a theory
with broad scope proceeds, not by single decisive experiments but by
the accumulation of cases that challenge defenders to find any way of
supplementing the central principles. The history of science is full of
theories that come to grief because of the building up of difficulties.
Darwin's theory of evolution isn't among the shipwrecks.
Philip Kitcher, Born-Again Creationism, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND
ITS CRITICS, supra note 15, at 278.
119. Johnson has written that scientific naturalists "can impose a rule of
procedure that disqualifies purely negative argument, so that a theory which
obtains some very modest degree of empirical support can become immune to
disproof until and unless it is supplanted by a better naturalistic theory." John-
son, supra note 75, at 73.
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scientists do not, and should not, abandon a dominant theory
until a more persuasive scientific theory is offered in its place do
suggest a limited role for negative arguments. 120 To avoid confu-
sion, it helps to clarify what negative arguments are good for.
Suppose that a critic presents a powerful argument that ran-
dom mutation and natural selection, and other explanatory
devices of neo-Darwinian theory, cannot persuasively account for
certain developments toward complex life as we know it. Such
an argument should make us believe it is somewhat less likely that
present neo-Darwinian theory affords an accurate account. It
will not establish the eventual unpersuasiveness of the neo-Dar-
winian explanation. And it certainly will not show the likely truth
of any single alternative. A negative argument about one theory
supports any particular alternative only if that alternative is itself
plausible and stronger than other alternatives.
An illustration turns out to have a powerful significance for
what schools might teach about the development of complex life.
Perhaps the most common challenge to evolutionary theory is
that imperceptible, gradual changes cannot explain the origin of
complicated organs, such as the eye and the wing. The eye
requires a great many parts to function in a particular and pre-
cise way. Yet a slight development toward any one of these parts
would confer no competitive advantage; therefore, mutations of
genes producing physical features in any of these directions
would not survive; therefore, the eye could not develop by slow
changes in a great many parts if these changes were "undirected"
and depended on natural selection for their survival. No one, of
course, knows just how the eye did develop, and since the parts
of the eye are made up of soft tissue, we have no fossil record of
its stages. Evolutionary theorists tell us that progressive gradual
development is entirely plausible.'
21
120. Having reviewed and rejected justificationist, probabilistic, and dog-
matic falsificationist notions of scientific knowledge, Imre Lakatos defended
what he called sophisticated methodological falsificationism, according to
which "no experiment, experimental report, observational statement or well-
corroborated low-level falsifying hypothesis alone can lead to falsification.
There is no falsification before the emergence of a better theory." Imre
Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in CRITI-
CISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 91, 109 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave
eds., 1970); see also Imre Lakatos, Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research
Programmes, in LXIX PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 149, 163
(1969). ("There must be no elimination without the acceptance of a better
theory.").
121. See, e.g., DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 77-86. A degree of sensitivity to
light could be very helpful in comparison with blindness (and various parts may
also have served other purposes or have been genetically related to other valua-
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A similar argument about complex parts has been advanced
about the molecules that make up cells. According to Michael
Behe, "the elegance and complexity of biological systems at the
molecular level have paralyzed science's attempt to explain their
origins."122 Life is based on molecular machines, and many bio-
chemical processes are "staggeringly complicated." 23 When one
looks at cilia, bacterial flagella, the mechanism for blood clot-
ting, and other microsystems, one finds "irreducibly complex sys-
tems," of which the mousetrap, with its various working parts, is a
simple example. Such a system is "composed of several well-
matched, intersecting parts that contribute to the basic function,
wherein the removal of any one of the parts causes the system to
effectively cease functioning."'124 For such systems, a gradualist,
neo-Darwinian explanation of development by natural selection
is implausible because elements serving no function before full
development of the entire system would not survive and elements
of simpler systems (serving some function) would not combine in
the right way to perform a different complex function. Behe
notes that attempted explanations of how such systems could
have developed by natural selection are few and far between.
12 5
ble features), so we can imagine a slow progression from blindness to the full
eye.
122. MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARWIN's BLACK Box: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHAL-
LENGE TO EVOLUTION X (1998) [hereinafter DARWIN'S BLACK Box]; see also
Michael J. Behe, Molecular Machines: Experimental Support for the Design Inference,
in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 15, at 241-56.
Miller suggests that Behe's argument is closely similar to that made about the
eye. Miller, supra note 12, at 130-36.
123. DARWIN'S BLACK Box, supra note 122, at 22.
124. Id. at 39. It is fair to say that this is not a precise definition. As Pro-
fessor Behe's responses at a debate over intelligent design, at the American
Museum of Natural History on April 23, 2002, made clear, a system could qual-
ify if it had some redundant parts, or if the elimination of one (nonredundant)
part would still permit the function to be served fairly well. An example, dis-
cussed by Miller, is animals whose blood clots without every aspect of the full
clotting systems. MILLER, supra note 12, at 152-61. These clarifications may sug-
gest that no sharp line exists between "irreducibly complex" and other systems,
but they undercut Behe's basic argument only insofar as they indicate a greater
possibility than he acknowledges of development from simple to highly com-
plex systems.
125. "[None of the papers published in [the Journal of Molecular Evolu-
tion] over the entire course of its life as a journal has ever proposed a detailed
model by which a complex biochemical system might have been produced in a
gradual step-by-step Darwinian fashion." DARWIN'S BLACK Box, supra note 122,
at 176. Miller responds that there have been such articles written after Behe's
book and that the main reason more has not been done is that scientists do not
yet know just how these biochemical systems work. MILLER, supra note 12, at
147-52. For further discussion, see FRANKLN M. HAROLD, THE WAY OF THE
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Let us suppose for now, contrary to what evolutionary biolo-
gists themselves claim, that organs like the eye or biochemical
processes within cells are very hard for neo-Darwinian evolution-
ists to explain. Does it follow that Genesis creationism or intelli-
gent design is true? Of course not. A neo-Darwinian
explanation may prove to be accurate, even if now it does not
seem highly convincing. Or, other elements may eventually fig-
ure in scientific explanations of evolution that are not aspects of
the prevailing dominant theory.' 26 One such possibility was
offered by Gordon Rattray Taylor after he suggested that "the
repeated occurrences of changes calling for numerous coordi-
nated innovations" (such as the eye and the wing) is one among
"a dozen areas where the theory of evolution by natural selection
seems either inadequate, implausible or definitely wrong."'127 He
asserted that, in order to explain all aspects of evolution, we
should imagine "some directive force or process [that] works in
conjunction with it. I do not mean by that a force of a mystical
kind, but rather some property of the genetic mechanism the
existence of which is at present unsuspected.' 1 28 Stuart Kauffman
has developed a "complexity theory," according to which the
"order of the biological world . . . is not merely tinkered, but
arises naturally and spontaneously because of ... principles of
self-organization-laws of complexity that we are just beginning
to uncover and understand."'' 29 The development of life is the
product of both the spontaneous order of self-organized systems
and natural selection.
CELL: MOLECULES, ORGANISMS AND THE ORDER OF LIFE 189-215 (2001) (offering
a general evolutionary explanation for the development of complex cells).
126. Further, if no scientific explanation suffices, science may provide no
basis to prefer the account in Genesis to the diverse creation myths of other
religions.
127. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 137. Taylor acknowledged that natural
selection does very well in explaining relatively minor changes within species.
Dawkins provides some idea of his regard for Taylor when he chastises a theolo-
gian for relying on him and three other authors rather than on biologists.
DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 38.
128. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 137. On this page, Taylor suggests only that
the evidence he has presented makes "it necessary to consider" this possibility
"quite seriously"; but the remainder of the book makes clear that Taylor
believes, further, this explanation is probably correct.
129. STUART KAUFFMAN, supra note 116, at vii; see also id. at 23-25. In
defending a neo-Darwinian approach, Pennock comments, "There might also
turn out to be underlying patterns of order that emerge because of the self-
organizing properties of non-equilibrium systems, or because of limits imposed
on evolutionary change by developmental constraints." PENNOCK, supra note 2,
at 103.
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At first glance we might suppose that if order or design may
have had some role in the development of life, it must have been
intelligent. Who is doing the designing if not an intelligent
being? But think about the development of a single-cell human
embryo into a multicell baby with bones, nerves, muscles, blood,
and complex organs. The development from the single cell is
not random; it is programmed according to the DNA in its genes.
Although many people regard this development as an amazing
sign of God's handiwork, we have a natural explanation that does
not depend on any premise about an intelligent Creator. Kauff-
man sees this ontogeny as an example of spontaneous order, 30
and something similar could occur concerning the development
of genes over generations, as Taylor and Kauffman suppose. In
short, scientists may one day discover principles of order in the
whole process of the beginning of life and evolutionary develop-
ment that roughly resemble the design that undoubtedly exists in
the development from the inception of single cells to the birth of
babies.
If nonintelligent order or design is conceivable, could
empirical evidence support intelligent design? If we knew from
scientific evidence that one day human beings appeared on the
earth without any close forebears (and without having been
deposited by aliens from outer space), that would strongly sug-
gest purposeful creative action, since the likelihood of any natu-
ral explanation would seem very slight. But much scientific
evidence of order will be indecisive between intelligent design
and the kind of design of which Taylor and Kauffman write. If
we are only at the beginning of any full understanding of the
development of life, how can we know whether someday we will
comprehend how development might proceed by a nonrandom
process that bears a resemblance to the development from
embryo to baby? This recognition of our ignorance should make
us very hesitant to move from negative arguments about one pos-
sibility to a confident embrace of any single alternative. 1 In any
130. KAUFFMAN, supra note 116, at 93-112.
131. However, Behe argues that the same features that show the implausi-
bility of a Darwinian explanation also establish the great likelihood of intelli-
gent design. See generally DARWIN'S BLACK Box, supra note 122. See also WILLIAM
A. DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN INFERENCE (1998) (adopting a mathematical approach
to complexity). Providing a detailed analysis of probability theory, Dembski
argues that when the improbability of a patterned outcome is very high, one
can rule out regularity and chance in favor of intelligent design. Id. (I discuss
the inference to intelligent design in a later section.) Although he rejects
claims about intelligent design, Miller suggests that most scientists he knows
agree "that in a general way, we really do understand how nature works."
MILLER, supra note 12, at 263.
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event, the negative arguments themselves certainly do not get us
there.
But that does not mean the negative arguments lack all
force. Even were such arguments to present nothing of scientific
plausibility to take the place of a prevailing theory, that would
not be a sufficient ground to reject them out of hand. It is now
common currency among philosophers of science that individual
anomalies, instances in which observations do not comport with
what a theory predicts (or "retrodicts"), do not undermine scien-
tific theories; but a very powerful criticism of a theory should be
taken seriously whether or not the critic offers a substitute. Were
scientists to understand that a dominant theory has been ren-
dered unpersuasive or highly vulnerable, some of them, at least,
should search for a better theory, even if the critic himself can-
not provide one.
13 2
A second reason for not automatically rejecting negative
challenges to evolutionary theory is that creationist and intelli-
gent design criticisms are offered mainly on the issue of what is
true overall. If the positive claim is that God has created by means
that transcend ordinary natural processes, the critics do not have
an alternative positive theory cast in terms of a natural explana-
tion; the whole point is that any explanation that relies exclusively
on standard science is false. I shall later pursue some important
implications of this understanding, but how is the scientist, as
scientist, to respond to negative criticisms of evolution offered by
advocates of a position that the true explanation for much of the
development of life is nonscientific? The scientist may reiterate
her commitment to methodological naturalism as justifying her
continuing reliance upon the best theory science has yet to offer,
that is, evolutionary theory; but she cannot fairly dismiss negative
arguments against evolutionary theory, so long as everyone
understands that the negative arguments are offered for the pro-
position that some explanation other than a scientific one is
accurate, and the challengers provide such an explanation. The
evolutionist can argue that the alternative itself is highly implau-
132. If other alternatives are already in the field, scientists might give
them renewed attention. See Karl Popper, Natural Science and Its Dangers, in CRiT-
ICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 120, at 51, 54-56. If there is
a dominant paradigm of the sort described by THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIrIc REVOLUTIONS (1962), at least some scientists might devote their
efforts to trying to imagine new possibilities that would significantly revise or
overthrow crucial aspects of the dominant theory. However, since scientists
require some theoretical framework to guide their work, it is understandable
that most scientists will continue to use the prevailing theory until an alternative
is put forward.
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sible, much less persuasive than evolutionary theory, but she can-
not rule the negative criticisms out of bounds because the critics
put forward no scientific alternative to Darwinism.
Challenges to evolution that rely on disagreements among
evolutionary experts present a variation on the overall theme of
negative arguments. If two experts are strongly committed to a
general theory, does their disagreement about how a process
occurs influence one's confidence in their shared conclusion
about that theory? It all depends. Suppose two sports fans agree
that A beat B in a cross-country race. The first fan thinks that B
was trying her hardest but that she ran out of steam near the end.
The second fan, knowing of B's friendship with A, thinks he saw
B intentionally slow down so that A could win. The two fans disa-
gree about why B lost but that does not diminish in the slightest
the confidence we should have that they have correctly perceived
who won. To continue with the analogy, suppose neither fan saw
the race's finish, but both say they are sure A won. The first fan
says that A was well ahead at the halfway point and looked about
as strong as did B. The second fan says that B was ahead by 100
yards at the halfway mark, but looked much more winded than A,
who was closing fast. Here the disagreement about the reasons
why A probably won would make us wary about the shared con-
clusion that A almost certainly did win. Our confidence that A
won would go down from the time that we heard the fans' con-
clusion to the time we heard their conflicting explanations.
Our confidence in an aspect of evolutionary theory might be
similarly shaken if two experts present powerful reasons why the
theory of the other is not convincing. We might be led to doubt
that either of the positive theories is persuasive and thus might
be led to doubt that any account along those lines is persuasive.
Consider in this respect disagreement among leading scien-
tists about the plausibility of gradualism. Opponents of gradual-
ism, that is, imperceptible changes that slowly produce new
features like the eye, say that the standard explanation cannot
show how such changes occur, and that the fossil record does not
support gradualism. Proponents of gradualism claim in part the
implausibility of any scientific explanation of how larger, faster
changes could have occurred.' 33 If we think each side is convinc-
ing in its negative criticism of the other, we are left with the possi-
bility of large, fast changes not easily explicable by present
133. I am supposing, contrary to what Richard Dawkins has claimed in
DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 223-52, that the disagreement is substantial and not
mainly terminological. Among the points that Dawkins makes is that some rela-
tively small mutations in genes could cause large physical effects. Id. at 234-36.
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science. 3 14 Of course, future science may explain what present
science cannot; but one could take the powerful negative criti-
cisms as increasing the likelihood that a phenomenon is beyond
scientific explanation.
Probability claims present another variation on the force of
negative arguments about evolutionary theory.1"5 Claims that
the development of any life and of complex life were highly
improbable are neither as powerful as opponents of evolution
often believe nor as impotent as evolutionary theorists sometimes
suggest. Let us suppose that, given the physical conditions of the
earth four billion years ago, a very intelligent and informed
observer from another galaxy would have concluded that the
development of life-forms as complex as the "higher mammals"
was extremely unlikely.' 36 Does this show that natural processes
did not produce life as we know it?
No, the scientist responds, highly improbable events do hap-
pen, and we have no doubt what life-forms have developed.
Before-the-fact probabilities are irrelevant once we are aware
what actually happened. Imagine that someone throws a die five
times. The probability that the sequence will be exactly what it
turns out to be was only one in 7776 (6-5), but that would have
been true about any exact sequence of five throws of a die. The
low probability of this particular sequence in advance creates no
skepticism about its actual occurrence.
3 7
But this response, as so far developed, assumes what is at
issue, the persuasiveness of dominant evolutionary theory against
an alternative of order or design. If a person threw a die five
times and each time the die turned up six, we would wonder if
the die was weighted to show six. If a gambler who had control
of the die benefited from a throw of six, we would, at about the
third throw, begin to ask ourselves if six was a random outcome
or the consequence of his design. In an actual legal case, a Dem-
ocratic official had the job of determining by a random process,
outlined by a state statute, whether Democrats or Republicans
134. Addressing two competing suggestions about how cilia might have
developed according to standard evolutionary theory, Michael Behe concludes,
"Each points out the enormous problems with the other's model, and each is
correct." DARWIN's BLACK Box, supra note 122, at 69.
135. Behe remarks, "Mathematicians over the years have complained that
Darwinism's numbers just do not add up." Id. at 29.
136. I am passing over the argument that the physical conditions neces-
sary to sustain separate suns and planets were themselves highly improbable. I
am also passing over arguments based on alternative universes, which seem to
me to have little bearing, given our ignorance about whether other universes
exist.
137. See Kitcher, supra note 118, at 266.
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would have the advantageous top line of the ballot; on forty occa-
sions the Democrats ended up on top as compared with one out-
come favoring the Republicans.
138
For many, the force of the improbability argument for the
creation of complex life is to render more plausible the argu-
ment that design has been involved in the development of life."3 9
Of course, the argument will have that force only for someone
willing to entertain the possibility of design. A person who
believes that design is wildly implausible will not be dissuaded
from neo-Darwinism; he can respond that improbable events do
happen and we still have much to learn aboutjust how evolution
proceeded. He may also respond that the bases for various
probability estimates are extremely conjectural.
In his deservedly popular defense of dominant evolutionary
theory, Richard Dawkins accepts the relevance of probability
arguments, 4 ° but he adopts an unwarranted assumption that is
highly favorable to evolutionary theory.14'
Recognizing that any particular sequence of events, such as
the exact order of letters a monkey would type, is highly improb-
able, Dawkins says that what matters is the improbability of an
outcome that is particularly significant in some way, such as the
words, "Methinks it is like a weasel," an outcome whose
probability he puts at 10°.142 He assumes that the likelihood
138. See Mochary v. Caputo, 494 A.2d 1028 (N.J. 1985) (a civil case seek-
ing a reform of procedures). Caputo had not actually done the drawing him-
self in every instance. The state supreme court evinced no doubt that the
procedure had not consistently been fair. The case is discussed in DEMBSKI,
supra note 131, at 9-20, 162-67; Branden Fitchen et al., How Not to Detect
Design-Critical Notice: William A. Dembski, The Design Inference, in INTELLIGENT
DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 15, at 599-600. Dembski,
apparently relying on a newspaper report, supposes that a court would not be
willing to determine that Caputo had violated the law without more positive
evidence of what he had done; he also supposes that the court's hesitancy to
order particular reforms was based on its problems with the evidence. Id. at
18-19. I understand the court's opinion somewhat differently. Caputo's per-
sonal "guilt" was not at issue in the suit to reform procedures. The court's
hesitancy to order new procedures flowed from its belief that its recommenda-
tions would be followed and perhaps from its sense that the statutory scheme
left "discretion" about details to administration officials.
139. One could believe an improbability argument undermines presently
dominant explanations without believing that design or order is a needed
supplement.
140. He writes, "Measuring the statistical improbability of a suggestion is
the right way to go about assessing its believability." DAWKINS, supra note 12, at
41. DEMBSKI, supra note 131, at 155-62 (providing a more refined analysis of
Dawkins's claims about probability).
141. DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 139-47.
142. Id. at 141-42.
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that a planet would develop life with the degree of complexity of
life on earth is extremely slight. (For him, the greatest element in
the total improbability is life getting started at all from inanimate
matter; once life exists, cumulative selection is available to push it
to higher complexity.)
It is here that Dawkins makes his crucial moves. The rele-
vant probability for judging evolutionary theory, the "luck" we
can postulate, is correlated to the number of suitable planets for
life in the universe. He assumes that 100 billion billion planets
may be suitable. How much luck we could postulate depends on
how many of those planets actually have complex life. It is quite
consistent with highly improbable odds that complex life might
have developed on one planet. It is not an incredible coinci-
dence that the one planet with life is ours; of course, it has to be
ours, since we are highly complex life, able to understand what
has happened.
Dawkins persuasively establishes four propositions. (1) If
the universe has 100 billion billion suitable planets, we would
expect complex life to develop on at least one if the odds for
each suitable planet were more favorable than one in 100 billion
billion. (2) The existence of life on our planet does not necessa-
rily establish a high likelihood of life on other planets; ours may
be the single instance in which an incredibly long shot paid off.
(3) There is nothing paradoxical about that planet being ours.
(4) If the odds against any life beginning are extremely high,
although more favorable than one in 100 billion billion, we
should not be surprised that no one has yet figured out just how
life arose from nonlife.
14 3
But Dawkins's central question is "how much luck are we
allowed to assume in a theory of the origin of life on Earth? '144
He implicitly acknowledges that if complex life has arisen often,
say on one out of every thousand suitable planets, a theory
according to which complex life arises only once in roughly every
100 billion billion times is in trouble. But if complex life has
developed only once, or a very few times, such a theory can well
account for what has happened. Dawkins proceeds:
[I]f we assume, as we are perfectly entitled to do for the
sake of argument, that life has originated only once in the
universe, it follows that we are allowed to postulate a very
143. Dawkins discusses one broad approach. See id. at 146-58. Behe sum-
marizes the initial optimism about discerning how life began, from nonlife, fol-
lowed by a recognition of "staggering difficulties." DARWIN'S BLACK Box, supra
note 122, at 166-73; see also KAUFFMAN, supra note 116, at 31-45.
144. DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 143.
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large amount of luck in a theory, because there are so
many planets in the universe where life could have
originated.' 4 5
Thus, evolutionary theory is not vulnerable if it gives us reason to
suppose that the chances of developing complex life are more
than one in 100 billion billion.
The fly in the ointment is that we do not know about com-
plex life on most other planets. We do know that within our
solar system complex life is limited to earth, and we can draw
negative inferences about life as complex as ours for a few neigh-
boring solar systems, based on an absence of radio communica-
tion from them. We have not a clue about the vast majority of
planets in the universe. If someone asserts that a creationist or
design explanation is more plausible than that provided by domi-
nant evolutionary theory, I do not see why we should assume, in
making that comparison, that life exists only rarely or not at all on
all those planets.'4 6
Consider our analogous problems of the five throws of six
and the real case of forty election ballots with Democrats on top.
Suppose we were told that our die had been thrown enough
times so that one would expect at least one sequence of five sixes
in a row and that election officials that had done ballot determi-
nations enough times so that one would expect at least one
sequence of Democrats topping the ballot forty of forty-one
times. If we knew, to follow the die example, that five sixes had
happened only once, we would be reassured that its occurrence
may not have reflected cheating. 4 7 But suppose we were given
no information about all the other sequences. Perhaps many of
them were also sequences of sixes; we just don't know. Our esti-
mate of the probability of design-that is, cheating-would be
about the same whether the five throws of six were the first
sequence ever or one of a large number of other sequences
whose outcomes were unknown to us.' 4 8 Our conclusion about
145. Id. at 144.
146. Dawkins discusses the number of suns within relevant radio range
under various assumptions about when radio technology would have been
developed. Id. at 165. Ironically, if we knew that life existed only on Earth, that
could support both evolutionary theory and a creationist account according to
which human beings have a unique place in God's creation.
147. In fact, if someone with a powerful incentive to cheat controlled the
die, we might worry about cheating if the sequence was highly favorable to him
even if unremarkable from the standpoint of probabilities.
148. Of course, if an actual die never showed anything but six, we might
expect that the gambler would be in serious trouble long before a large number
of sequences of throws was made.
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the ballot determinations would be similar if we had no idea of
the outcomes of other sequences.
The opponent of evolution offers some form of design or
creative intervention as an explanation for much development of
life-including the crucial first step of no life to life. He argues
that occurrence of this by ordinary natural causes is so unlikely
that his theory is more persuasive than neo-Darwinism. For this
purpose, the existence of planets about which we know nothing
hardly seems relevant. If the evolutionist acknowledges that his
theory would be the less plausible of the two if complex life
existed on one suitable planet in every thousand in the uni-
verse"' but would be the more plausible if complex life existed
on only one planet in the universe, he cannot assume for this pur-
pose that life exists on only one. Of course, if the evolutionist can
wholly rule out all alternatives involving intelligent creation
action on some other basis, he can rest content on the grounds
that extremely improbable things do happen, and that evolution-
ary theory remains our best explanation of the highly improba-
ble development of complex life. But if this is the response,
whether there are a hundred planets in the universe or 100 bil-
lion billion planets hardly matters.
C. How Plausible Are the Contending Positions?
Creationists and design theorists argue that the scientific evi-
dence does not support neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory as a
complete account of life's development. As I have mentioned,
they contend that the development of any life, much less com-
plex life, was extremely unlikely absent purposeful direction.
They point out that many links between species supposed by evo-
lutionary theory are not supported by the fossil record. And they
refer to disagreements about the methods and timing of change
as showing that proponents have no convincing version of evolu-
tionary theory.
Evolutionists respond that there are reasons why the fossil
record is seriously incomplete. It takes special conditions for fos-
sils to be made; and soft tissue like eyes does not produce fossils
at all. We can understand why only a very small percent of spe-
cies that have ever existed are revealed by fossils and why the
gaps are as they are.'5 °
149. I strongly doubt that Dawkins would make this concession. He
thinks the observable facts are so out of line with a creationist or intelligent
design approach that evolutionary theory should be preferred, even if it has big
problems with probability.
150. KITCHER, supra note 2, at 106-15.
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Biologists who disagree to some extent about the pace of
evolution agree that evolutionary theory is correct in its major
premises,' most notably that the earth is very old, that life
somehow developed naturally from nonlife, 152 that all life pro-
ceeds from a common ancestor (or very few ancestors)' 5 3 and
that natural selection explains much of that development.
Relatively few research biologists and paleontologists believe
that the attack on evolutionary theory is compelling. That, of
course, may be because virtually all these professional scientists
are biased, or locked into approaches in which they were edu-
cated; 154 but the weight of scientific opinion must give non-
experts pause about accepting challenges to neo-Darwinism,
especially since evolutionary theorists have reasonable-sounding
answers to those challenges.
55
Creation science in its full-blown, literal-Genesis form lacks
scientific support. In this creationist account, as I have noted,
fossils of different animals were made at roughly the same time.
The reason why simpler species are found in lower rock strata
and more complex species in higher strata is that the more com-
plex species were able to climb higher before being over-
whelmed by the Great Flood. Various modern techniques for
dating rocks are inaccurate because the flood brought about
changes in natural processes. All "kinds" were created in a
period of days; development has occurred only within "kinds."
Fossils of animals that evolutionary theory posits were separated
in time-such as dinosaurs and human beings-may be found
together at some locations.
The problems with this theory are overwhelming. I have
already mentioned the many scientific disciplines that suggest
that the earth is far more than 10,000 years old. Geologists had
151. Id. at 144-55.
152. Strictly speaking, how life developed from nonlife is not an aspect of
evolutionary biology, PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 161, but in discussions of evolu-
tion and creationism, it is usually included.
153. Pennock says, "Nothing in evolutionary theory requires a single origin
.... Id. at 144.
154. The history of science, as Thomas Kuhn has shown, does reveal
instances in which scientists have clung to existing "paradigms" for reasons
other than scientific evidence, see KUHN, supra note 132; but scientists did shift
from a Newtonian view of physical laws when Einstein presented powerful argu-
ments for special and general relativity, and scientists subsequently accepted a
quantum theory that was highly counterintuitive and rejected in part by Ein-
stein. See PAGELS, supra note 49, at 60-65, 96-97, 160-65.
155. Of course, one of the answers is that scientists do not have a full
explanation for why things happened as they did; but that is an aspect of much
of science.
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already reached this conclusion long before Darwin came
along.156 Modern estimates of the age of the earth, based on
various methods of dating, range between 4.2 and 4.8 billion
years. 157 The ratio between 10,000 years and 4.5 billion years is
approximately the same as that between 1 hour and 50 years.
(We wouldn't have much of a problem figuring out whether a
human being had been alive one hour or fifty years.) The crea-
tionist claim that the flood somehow altered natural processes, in
a manner that makes all modern methods of dating unreliable, is
implausible, at best. 158 Against the creationist idea that all
"kinds" were created about the same time is very powerful evi-
dence that simple life-forms preceded complex ones and further
evidence that simpler species developed into more complex
ones. Those claiming that the fossil record at places such as the
Paluxy Riverbed contradicts evolutionary theory may have mis-
read the natural evidence or been duped by fraud. All in all, the
scientific case for creationism in its standard modern form is
extremely weak.
The comparatively modest claims about intelligent design
are more plausible, if they do not go beyond challenging the
dominant explanation of why complex life developed as it did
and proposing that intelligent design best accounts for a part of
what dominant theory fails to explain. In this form, intelligent
design is consistent with empirical evidence, which itself cannot
rule out a possible role for creative intelligence that transcends
ordinary scientific principles at various stages of the process; but
the theory is not established by existing scientific evidence. One
may think the development of life can be entirely explained with-
out any reference to design (beyond the obvious ability of orga-
nisms to replicate their own characteristics) or with reference to
an order or design that is not intelligent. And future scientific
evidence might support one of those alternatives to intelligent
design.
D. Domains of Science and Science Courses
Could "scientific" creationism and intelligent design qualify
as science, or belong in a science course, if they were sufficiently
plausible?
156. KITCHER, supra note 2, at 63.
157. Id. at 159; see also id. at 155-64.
158. One might, of course, believe that God has made things so that our
rational faculties will be deceived about reality; but if one accepts that premise,
it is hard to know how one should understand the scientific enterprise
generally.
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In a decision striking down Arkansas's Balanced Treatment
Act, Judge Overton wrote that the "essential characteristics of sci-
ence are: (1) it is guided by natural law; (2) it has to be explana-
tory by reference to natural law; (3) it is testable against the
empirical world; (4) its conclusions are tentative, i.e., are not
necessarily the final word; and (5) it is falsifiable."'159 According
to Judge Overton, creation science fails each of these criteria.
Supernatural creation is neither guided by, nor explained by ref-
erence to, natural law. It is not testable against the empirical
world; it is not falsifiable; and, given the commitment of creation
scientists to the Genesis account, its conclusions are not regarded
as tentative. 
160
Larry Laudan, a philosopher of science, responded to Judge
Overton's opinion as "reached... by a chain of argument which
is hopelessly suspect." 61 Because creation scientists make claims
of fact, for which there is relevant scientific evidence, their claims
are testable and falsifiable. It is true that not every claim of crea-
tionists is testable, but "it is now widely acknowledged that many
scientific claims are not testable in isolation either, but only
when they are embedded in part of a larger system of statements,
some of whose consequences can be submitted to test.'
6 2 If
many claims of creationism are testable, then the theory is revisable,
whatever may be the opinions of most creation scientists. 63
Laudan also pointed out that scientists may try to establish the
existence of a phenomenon before they are able to explain it in a
law-like way.' 64 As of 1982, this was true about the theory of plate
tectonics, and at the time of Darwin's The Origin of Species, it was
true about major aspects of his own theory. Thus, the failure
now to be able to explain how creation occurred does not neces-
sarily disqualify creation science from being science.
Lamenting Judge Overton's anachronistic efforts to revive a
variety of discredited criteria for distinguishing between the sci-
entific and nonscientific, Laudan concluded, "The core issue is
not whether creationism satisfies some undemanding and highly
controversial definitions of what is scientific; the real question is
159. McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1267 (E.D. Ark.
1982).
160. Id. at 1267-68.
161. Larry Laudan, Commentary on Ruse: Science at the Bar-Causes for Con-
cern, in CRvAIONISM, SCIENCE, AND THE LAw: THE ARKANSAS CASE 161-66 (M.
LaFollette ed., 1983) (Larry Laudan, Science at the Bar: Causes for Concern, in
MURPHY, supra note 1, at 149).
162. Id. at 151.
163. Id. at 151-52.
164. Id. at 152-53.
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whether the existing evidence provides stronger arguments for
evolution than for creationism." 
65
1. Evolutionary Theory as Science
In the course of evaluating the scientific credentials of evolu-
tion and creationism, Philip Kitcher comments on the nature of
scientific theories. Simple, popular ideas that scientific theories
must necessarily be able to predict consequences or are necessa-
rily falsifiable individually (naive falsification) are misguided.
166
"[N]o major scientific theory has ever exemplified the relation
between theory and evidence that the traditional model
presents."' 67 What is true is that a scientific theory must have
observational consequences, that it must be capable of being true
or false. Three characteristics of successful science are indepen-
dent testability, unification, and fecundity.1 6 1 Independent
testability occurs when one can "test auxiliary hypotheses inde-
pendently of the particular cases for which they are intro-
duced."169  Unification involves applying problem-solving
strategies to a broad range of cases. Fecundity is the opening up
of new lines of investigation.
By these criteria, evolution easily qualifies as science. Against
creationist attacks that it is not really science, Kitcher responds
that evolutionary theory is highly successful science. Not only has
it solved problems, it "has unified biology and it has inspired
important biological disciplines."' 7 ° Kitcher concludes after an
examination of the claims of creationists that creation science is
not genuine science.17 '
Why exactly might creation science not qualify as science,
and do these reasons apply to the more modest theory of intelli-
gent design? We can identify at least four conceivable grounds
for disqualification. First, creation science posits a Divine Crea-
tor, which is not a scientific concept. Second, it provides an
explanation that is not according to natural laws. Third, its pro-
ponents are not open to contrary evidence, and the theory is,
therefore, not revisable or falsifiable. Fourth, little scientific evi-
dence favors it; its arguments against most aspects of evolutionary
theory are unconvincing and, in any event, do not establish its
own truth. We have already concluded that creationism in the
165. Id. at 154.
166. KITCHER, supra note 2, at 35-42.
167. Id. at 42.
168. Id. at 48.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 54.
171. Id. at 124-25.
ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS IDEAS
literal Genesis version has little scientific plausibility; were that all
that were involved, it would be hard to say whether creation sci-
ence is exceptionally bad science or not science at all.
As we examine the other three possibilities, our final con-
cern is what belongs in a science course, not precisely what con-
stitutes a scientific theory.
2. Reference to Divine Intelligence
Insofar as the terms of creation science refer to a nonscien-
tific Divine Creator, we can substitute "abrupt appearance of spe-
cies in complex form" for "Divine Creation." The language of
"abrupt appearance" avoids making any explicit theological
claim, while maintaining the idea that "kinds" of animals did not
evolve from lower species. But "abrupt appearance" still fails to
provide a scientific explanation for how it occurred and, thus,
points to a creative force not explicable in terms of scientific
explanations to which human beings are privy. The idea of intel-
ligent design, though not specifying what form the intelligence
beyond natural cause might take, suffers a similar disability.
However, a theory is not necessarily unscientific because its
truth bears on the likelihood of some religious tenet. Suppose
skeptical researchers replicate the experiment involving prayer
by strangers and obtain similar positive results. A thousand stud-
ies to this effect would not prove the existence of a divinity (or
devil) who intervenes in human affairs. The results might be
explained by a power of mental telepathy no one yet under-
stands.'7 2 Although showings that prayer consistently yields
highly improbable favorable outcomes would not prove a divin-
ity, it would constitute some evidence for that proposition. That
would not make the studies, or their conclusions about prayer,
unscientific and religious.
Many people believe that the Big Bang theory of the begin-
ning of the universe fits more comfortably with the idea of a God
172. Insofar as studies of prayer and illness have suggested that prayer
helps people recover from serious physical ailments, the explanation may be
that their mental states differ importantly from those of people who do not
pray. See GOLDBERG, supra note 22, at 40-47. Goldberg writes, "When an indi-
vidual prays for his own improvement, it is difficult to separate the power of
prayer from the placebo effect, that is from the benefits that flow simply from
the belief that one is doing something useful." Id. at 42. Of course, that effect
does not explain why prayer on behalf of others may be useful; but Goldberg,
writing before the study of Korean women seeking to become pregnant, indi-
cates that the scientific evidence that intercessory prayer, made without knowl-
edge of the intended beneficiary, does help is weaker and more controversial
than the evidence that prayer for oneself can help. GOLDBERG, supra note 22, at
42-43; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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who creates ex nihilo than the steady-state view of the universe,
which used to be popular.1 73 Acceptance of that theory as accu-
rate might make a reasonable person think that a Creator was
somewhat more likely than he previously thought.1 7 ' This con-
nection between its truth and the likelihood of a Creator does
not make the Big Bang theory religious.
A theory about the development of species is not necessarily
unscientific because it makes the existence of a Divine Creator
seem more likely. On this point, Professor Kitcher has written,
"Even postulating an unobserved Creator need be no more
unscientific than postulating unobservable particles. What mat-
ters is the character of the proposals and the way in which they
are articulated and defended. 1 75
3. An Explanation That Is Not Fully Natural
That the explanations of creationists and intelligent design
theorists seem to transcend scientific theory is a more troubling
problem. Indeed, I think this turns out to be the central theoret-
ical question about the status of intelligent design theory. Inso-
far as creationism purports to explain the development of life on
the basis of religious authority rather than scientific evidence, it
definitely moves from the realm of science into that of religion;
but a proponent of intelligent design may claim only that species,
individual organs, and molecular structures have appeared in a
manner that now defies standard scientific explanations and
seems likely to defy any future explanations that omit the action
of some creative intelligence.
1 7 6
173. Behe suggests that steady-state theory always had a difficult time
explaining much of the observational evidence from astronomy and that resis-
tance to the Big Bang theory was based partly on its perceived religious implica-
tions. DARWIN's BLACK Box, supra note 122, at 244-46.
174. See Robert John Russell, T=O: Is It Theologically Significant?, in RELIG-
ION AND SCIENCE 201-24 (W. Mark Richardson & WesleyJ. Wildman eds., 1996);
WARREN A. NORD & CHARLES C. HAYNES, TAKING RELIGION SERIOUSLY ACROSS
THE CURRICULUM 147 (1998) ("If the big bang theory does not confirm creation
ex nihilo, it is at least consonant with it . . ").
175. KITCHER, supra note 2, at 125. However, Murphy suggests that the
most serious problem of creationist theory is: "how can scientific sense or intel-
ligibility be given to creation as supernatural causation?" MURPHY, supra note 1,
at 44.
176. Behe puts it this way: "No one would be foolish enough to categori-
cally deny the possibility" of an "as-yet-undiscovered natural process that would
explain biochemical complexity", but "no one has a clue how it would work"
and "it would go against all human expeience .... DARWIN'S BLACK Box,
supra note 122, at 203-04.
ESTABISHING RELIGIOUS IDEAS
We need to recall, first of all, Laudan's point that scientists
may establish that certain physical events happen, or have hap-
pened, although they do not yet have any plausible scientific
explanation of how the events occur. Intelligent design is not dis-
qualified from the status of science simply because it offers no
present scientific explanation of how surprising changes may
have occurred. Is intelligent design disqualified because propo-
nents also claim that, on the basis of modern scientific evidence
and understanding, natural explanations will never suffice to
explain these changes?
Two points are crucially important here. The first is that we
can never be sure that ordinary scientific explanations will always
be unsatisfactory. What now seem miraculous medical cures may
later become explicable scientifically. And, to revert to our
prayer example, once scientists understand how mental
processes work, they might develop a convincing explanation for
the efficacy of intercessory prayer. A chemist may discover how
life could naturally have developed from non-life three billion
years ago. And, if human beings did not evolve from other spe-
cies, we may later learn that they appeared on earth without any
predecessor species because aliens from another galaxy put them
there (a natural explanation).' 77 So long as possible future
accounts of life's development include theories that do not
involve any creative intelligence that is beyond ordinary scientific
explanation, we cannot be confident that a full understanding
requires such a creative intelligence.
The second point is that it is not reasonably part of science
to be certain that a scientific explanation is conceivable for every
physical event that occurs in the universe. Many people, includ-
ing many scientists, may believe that, in principle, science could
explain everything (except perhaps the exact movements of par-
ticles); and scientific explanations have undoubtedly been forth-
coming for various events that human beings once believed
could not be explained by science; but it is a stretch to assume
that science can explain everything factual. Advocates of Genesis
creationism and intelligent design claim that the available scien-
tific evidence suggests that a purely scientific explanation of the
origin of species is not only not now forthcoming, but is unlikely
in the future. So understood, the theories, relying on scientific
evidence, are partly about the limits of science.
This insight is very important for whether intelligent design
could qualify as science or belong in a science course. A particu-
177. Sir Francis Crick has proposed that life on earth may have begun
when aliens seeded the planet with spores sent by a rocket ship. Id. at 248-49.
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lar theory that science "runs out" in some respect is subject to
observation and to falsification. If new evidence is produced or
scientific understanding of available evidence increases, scientists
can explain what was heretofore not explicable in scientific
terms.17 We could not, of course, expect an explanation of occur-
rences that is according to natural laws, when the whole point of a
theory is that in all probability natural laws cannot explain all the
data. That would be a little like saying that an investigation of a
claimed miracle cannot have been scientific if it concludes that
no natural explanation can be given for what has taken place.
We might conclude that theories about where science runs out
are not themselves scientific theories, although they rely on empiri-
cal data and are about the limits of scientific explanation.
The idea that creation science and intelligent design theory
are about the limits of science is a central assumption in what
follows, and it is worth pausing over it. Although I am not claim-
ing that any sharp line exists between ordinary observation and
science, between ordinary observation and religion, or between
positive theses and theories of limits, I nonetheless believe we
can best understand creationism and intelligent design theories
as being about the limits of science.
If a scientist ascertains the length of a day on a planet in
another solar system, using the most advanced technology, we
regard that as a scientific discovery. Yet the method of learning
is no different from our ordinary experience that the time
between one sunrise and the next is approximately what we have
arbitrarily labeled as twenty-four hours. In his famous argument
for design, William Paley said that if he finds a watch in a heath,
he knows it has been designed.'79 Had we traced the origin of
two thousand watches randomly chosen and found that all were
designed by human beings, we might call this a scientific conclu-
sion. As it is, we know that many watches have been designed,
and we can't imagine how else they would be generated. Ordi-
nary common sense tells us the watch in the field is designed."'
178. It seems doubtful that a theory that science runs out should necessa-
rily be unifying or fecund in the manner that Kitcher supposes successful sci-
ence should be, since it might or might not be true that science runs out in
similar ways across different subject matter areas.
179. WILLIAM PALEY, NATURAL THEOLOGY; OR EVIDENCES OF THE EXISTENCE
AND ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY. COLLECTED FROM THE APPEARANCES OF NATURE
9-10 (New York, American Tract Society 1809).
180. See WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 59, at 60 (remarking that a fisherman
who says that fish will not bite after heavy rains is "propounding a theory"; "sci-
entific activity is not to be differentiated from other human activities on the
ground that it deals with theories, not even . . . theories of a special kind").
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In a somewhat similar way, ordinary observation can shade
into, or shade toward, religious conclusions. If I observe a partic-
ular faith healer, invoking the power of Jesus, perform one amaz-
ing cure after another (and I somehow satisfy myself that more
than fraud and more than suggestive influence on the afflicted is
involved), I have strong evidence that the healer is tapping some
extraordinary power, and I have weaker evidence that Jesus has
some special status, a religious conclusion. If prayers to God for
rain consistently brought rain, I would have some evidence that
responses of a supernatural power to prayer could affect natural
physical processes, a religious conclusion. And, as we have seen,
a "scientific" experiment might also provide evidence for the
power of prayer.
Could a claim about supernatural causation of life's develop-
ment be part of a scientific explanation? 8 ' We may begin with
the possibility that a Creator has acted purposefully but for rea-
sons we do not understand. Some may doubt whether such a
claim involves an explanation at all. 82 It does involve explanation
in a sense-it attributes a physical event to a powerful intelligent
actor rather than to ordinary natural forces or another actor. It
involves an explanation to roughly the same degree as the follow-
ing comment: "Why did A die? B shot him, but I haven't the fog-
giest notion why." If one has no idea why the Creator has acted
as the Creator has, one certainly has no scientific explanation for
what has occurred.
83
Suppose that we had the kind of knowledge of supernatural
motivation that we find in Greek myths and the Bible. Zeus pun-
ished Prometheus because he was angered by his presumption;
God parted the Red Sea so his chosen people could escape.
Here our knowledge would be like that we have about the histori-
cal actions of individuals. We have some causal explanation, but
not one formulated in terms of general principles or laws. (Of
course, one might say that lurking in the background of any such
causal explanation is the implicit idea that similar conditions
would produce similar actions by similar individuals; but,
whatever merit this view may have for ordinary historical explana-
tions, it seems inapt as applied to an omnipotent God.)
Finally, we might think we do have an explanation formulat-
able in terms of a general principle, such as "God responds favor-
181. For the view that science cannot accommodate supernatural expla-
nations, see PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 189-94.
182. On the ambiguity of the term "explanation," see id. at 185-89.
183. Michael Behe urges that one can infer design "without knowing any-
thing about the designer." DARWIN's BLACK Box, supra note 122, at 97.
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ably to every sincere prayer."' 84 If the basis for the explanation
were evidence of a scientific sort, we might think the explanation
itself should be viewed as scientific, expanding our view of what
science covers beyond natural processes to supernatural
processes subject to law-like explanations. (We could imagine a
version of intelligent design theory that acknowledged that all
aspects of the development of life could be explained naturally,
according to ordinary scientific principles, but that the existence
of these principles showed intelligent design.)
18 5
When I say that creation science and intelligent design the-
ory are about the limits of scientific explanation, I mean roughly
that they do not offer an explanation of why a Creative Spirit acts
that depends on scientific or ordinary observational evidence or
an explanation of physical events that can be cast in terms of
general principles, much less principles of a scientific sort.
Do theories about the limits of science belong in science
courses? When one cuts through the rhetoric and wildly differ-
ing estimates about whether evolutionary theory, in roughly its
present form, provides an adequate explanation for the develop-
ment of life, this issue emerges as a central conflict between
those who think intelligent design is a proper topic and those
who think it is not.
A debate before the Ohio school board, as reported by The
New York Times, is highly instructive. 8 6 According to the story,
critics of intelligent design "warned that speculative theories of
some ultimate agent underpinning evolution were the antithesis
184. It might reasonably be objected that this formulation is too vague to
be a general principle, since "responds favorably" could cover so many different
kinds of response other than satisfaction of specific requests.
185. Usually when someone sees that an object is intelligently designed,
she will have some rough idea about the purposes of the designer. She may
have a pretty good idea of the immediate functional purpose ("so that blood
may clot") and a more limited idea of more ulterior purposes ("so that animals
may survive," "so that animals may flourish"). Thus, contrary to what Behe inti-
mates, when one infers a design, one usually can infer something about the
designer. DARWIN's BLACK Box, supra note 122, at 183. Behe concluded that
"[t]he question of the identity of the designer will simply be ignored by sci-
ence," Id. at 251. This is somewhat arbitrary if it forecloses all inferences about
what the Creator might be like. Such a limit might be justified if based on a
sense that scientific evidence yields a high probability of intelligent design but
little information about the designer.
186. Francis X. Clines, Ohio Board Hears Debate on an Alternative to Darwin-
ism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002, at A16. A further discussion, including comment
on the resolution of the Ohio board, took place on Talk of the Nation. Talk of
the Nation: This Science Friday (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Nov. 8, 2002), availa-
ble at http://www.sciencefriday.com/pages/20O2/Nov/hourl_1 10802.html (on
file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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of true science. ' ' l s v Darwin's theory had grown by "repeated
experimentation and discovery that intelligent design had not
been subject to."' 8  One critic, Dr. Lawrence Krauss, said that
proponents of intelligent design "were trying to force 'unanswer-
able questions' about some theoretical instigator of life onto a
school curriculum properly limited to the rigorous proofs of sci-
ence."189 Another critic, Dr. Kenneth R. Miller, complained that
claims of intelligent design "had not been submitted to peer
review the way other theories must be tested to be scientifically
accepted."' 9 ° A proponent of intelligent design, Dr. Stephen C.
Meyer, countered that "'the methods of science are part of the
debate' that teachers should air."191
If intelligent design theorists contend that dominant natural
explanations can only partly explain the development of life, and
that a supplement of intelligent creative action is required, it is a
little hard to know what "experiments" of their own they should
be expected to produce and why they may not legitimately rely
heavily on the evidence and explanations of evolutionists, argu-
ing for the unpersuasiveness of the explanations.' 92 And how
can their own explanation be subjected to "the rigorous proofs of
science" if the explanation is not in terms of natural causes? 93
In this debate, evolutionists are implicitly claiming that theo-
ries about where scientific explanations may fall short do not
belong in science classes; proponents of intelligent design
strongly disagree. The answer to this fundamental theoretical
issue is that the limits of science could be an appropriate subject
for science courses; but this answer needs explication, and it may





192. Behe proposes research into what systems are irreducibly complex
and thus the product of design. DARWIN's BLACK Box, supra note 122, at
230-31. But these are not experiments "to prove" that such complex systems
could only be the fruit of intelligent design.
193. About an individual claimed miracle, one might come close to rul-
ing out a natural explanation; the rigorous proofs of science might be
employed to show that a scientific explanation is not possible. It is hard to
conceive of that happening for the history of the development of life, about
whose details we are much more substantially ignorant, although Behe does
claim that the inference to intelligent design from irreducibly complex systems
is very powerful. See id.
Peer review is a more complex issue. In theory, there is no reason why
scientists should not carefully review arguments made about the limits of sci-
ence. But many scientists may not consider that to be within their domain.
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have little practical bearing on whether schools should teach
intelligent design.
We need first to distinguish between two kinds of limits.
Roughly speaking, we can divide limits of the subject matter of
science from limits within the range that scientific principles
ordinarily cover. Science cannot explain why people should be
ethical' 9 4 or why anything exists at all. 9 5 These limits are intrin-
sic limits, set by the nature of the scientific enterprise. These
intrinsic limits might well be mentioned in science courses, but
their full development is not within the domain of science. But
suppose a subject matter does fall broadly within the domain of
science, and yet scientific evidence suggests that no natural
explanation suffices for what has happened. So it is with claims
of medical miracles and of interventions in the development of
life. If convincing evidence of such limits lies within science
itself, their analysis appropriately falls within the scope of science
courses. To draw an analogy, a course in economics or political
science would properly discuss the reasons why models fall short
of predicting real world consequences. 1
9 6
Scientists might concede the logic of this suggestion and
deny its practical relevance. According to the premise of meth-
odological naturalism, scientists proceed on the assumption that
natural explanations will be forthcoming for physical events that
are now inexplicable. That premise has proven extremely pro-
ductive; and we have nothing close to convincing evidence that
science will not be able to explain the development of life in the
future. Scientists themselves cannot proceed without fruitful
research programs,' 97 and theories about limits may not provide
these.19 8 Rather than talk about limits, perhaps science teachers
should follow scientists and tell students that science looks for
natural explanations.
194. Science might explain why people have come to value what they do,
and it might show that ethical behavior helps preserve the species; but any such
explanations fall short of providing reasons why people otherwise inclined, and
caring more about their own satisfaction than human survival, should act
ethically.
195. If science can explain how matter originated, it cannot explain why
there was anything with the potentiality to turn into matter.
196. Because these subjects deal mainly with contemporary phenomena,
and the limits concern human behavior, it is easier to design research that can
establish the limited effectiveness of models for prediction than can be the case
for possible interventions by God millions of years ago.
197. For a general discussion of this, see the two essays by Imre Lakatos
cited supra note 120.
198. But see supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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Although a strong connection exists between what practic-
ing scientists do and the content of science courses, the teacher
should explore certain issues the scientist may put to one side.
Ideally, a science teacher or text might say something like this:
Modern science rests on an assumption that natural expla-
nations can be given for physical events. We cannot be cer-
tain that natural explanations will always suffice, but
physics, chemistry, and biology have made amazing
advances by indulging in that assumption. Were there pow-
erful evidence that science could not conceivably explain
some phenomena, this evidence of limits would belong in
science courses;' 9 some people believe such evidence
exists about evolutionary processes, but it is too soon to
conclude that any difficulties with evolutionary theory can-
not be rectified by scientific explanation.
20 0
4. Close-mindedness
Our third possible difficulty with creation science is that its
proponents are not open to evidence that counts against their
theory. No doubt, receptivity varies to some degree, but mem-
bers of important creation science organizations, the Creation
Research Society and the Institute for Creation Science, must
affirm-indeed, must take an oath-that they believe in the Gene-
sis account of creation.20 ' Could such adherents possibly be gen-
uine scientists about the origins of life?
We need to distinguish conceptual possibilities from proba-
ble realities. A scientist might have the following attitude: "I
believe strongly in the Genesis account on religious grounds, but
when I am working as a scientist I stick strictly to standard scien-
tific methods. As a scientist, I am completely open to evidence
that counts against Genesis. If strong contrary evidence actually
199. One might think that such limits should be a small part of the sub-
ject matter of science, even if total exclusion is unwarranted.
200. I am not suggesting that these very words are the right ones to speak
to ninth or tenth graders, but I am confident the ideas they express can be
communicated to high-school students. Here is how Philip Kitcher put the
views of a thoughtful evolutionist:
The evidence for the universal relatedness of life is compelling. Fur-
ther, we know of a number of natural processes that have produced
evolutionary change. We can't always say for sure which of these has
been operative at which stage of life, nor do we know that our inven-
tory of possible mechanisms is complete, but, on the evidence we
have, there's no reason to think that any supernatural process was
needed in the evolution of organisms.
Kitcher, supra note 118, at 272.
201. NELKIN, supra note 1, at 79-81.
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existed, I would then have to decide whether I trusted religious
authority more than scientific method." Notice that even if our
creationist were certain in advance that he would give more
credit to religious authority, he could still be open to the possibil-
ity that scientific evidence would fail to support religious truth.
Quite apart from the scientist's own beliefs, he might propound
a theory that was open to observational evidence.
When we turn from these conceptual possibilities to real life,
we must acknowledge that those who are certain on religious
grounds that Genesis is literally true are not the best people to
consider the scientific evidence in a suitably detached way.2"2
Their strong precommitments should render anyone who does
not share their religious premises suspicious of their scientific
claims. We might expect that their enterprise is seeking all avail-
able evidence and theory to support an account they already
know is true, not to undertake a fair appraisal of the balance of
scientific evidence.2 °3
Someone who believes only in an undefined degree of intel-
ligent design has much less of a precommitment. 20 4 He can be
open to the possibility that science will establish other explana-
tions for what he now thinks can best be explained by intelligent
design. 20 5  Although most proponents of intelligent design
undoubtedly have religious reasons for resisting the persuasive-
ness of the neo-Darwinian synthesis,20 6 that alone is not an ade-
quate reason to discount their arguments about its scientific
inadequacy. Were it the case that proponents of intelligent
design did not take their own scientific arguments very seriously,
but saw intelligent design as a means to get as much religion as
202. This will be especially true if they are firmly convinced, on theologi-
cal grounds, that scientific evidence must support the account revealed to be
true by religious authority.
203. I do not mean to imply that all neo-Darwinians who view evidence
against natural selection make a "fair appraisal" and consider the evidence "in a
suitably detached way." However, evolutionists are less committed to specific
details about life's development. According to Nicholas Wolterstorff, we all,
including scientific experts, have "control beliefs" that affect our evaluation of
proposed theories: "the person who exhibits authentic Christian commitment
cannot take for granted that the data beliefs and theories of contemporary
scientists are true." WOLTERSTORFF, sup-a note 59, at 78.
204. Such a person may or may not be open to the possibility that non-life
became life according to some natural explanation, to the possibility that all
complex life-forms developed from one-cell life, and to other possibilities that
Genesis creationists deny.
205. See NoR & HAYNES, supra note 174, at 142-43, 158-59.
206. It is also true that many evolutionists think intelligent design is not
plausible, because they reject its religious assumptions.
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possible into teaching about the development of life,2 °7 stronger
reasons would exist to discount what they say about science with-
out close examination.
In its typical Genesis form, creation science does not belong
in the science curriculum. Either it is non-science or very bad
science. It does not present a reasonable scientific explanation
of the development of life on earth, and it lacks substantial argu-
ment and evidence that anything other than Darwinian evolution
is the primary explanation for that development. The appeal for
"fair treatment" is misplaced. School students should not be
expected to choose between a powerful scientific theory and one
without merit that happens to coincide with many of their relig-
ious beliefs. As Kitcher says, "It is educationally irresponsible to
pretend that an idea that is scientifically worthless deserves scien-
tific discussion. "208
However, science teachers should cover the evidential gaps
and controversies surrounding the neo-Darwinian synthesis. Any
evidence for some kind of order or design, intelligent or other-
wise, should be fairly presented. Teachers should indicate pre-
sent uncertainties by no means show that the dominant theory,
or the dominant theory supplemented by novel scientific princi-
ples, will not be able to explain everything important in the
future. They should explain that if the development of life has
proceeded partly on the basis of some order that neo-Darwinian
theory neglects, that order may or may not reflect an intelligent
design. Science teachers should not get far into the question of
whether any principles of order in evolution, were they to exist,
would come from a Creative Intelligence.2 °9
207. Some evolutionists seem to view Phillip Johnson in this way, relying
partly on his characterization of his aims as "the Wedge strategy." See Barbara
Forrest, The Wedge at Work: How Intelligent Design Creationism Is Wedging Its Way
into the Cultural and Academic Mainstream, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM
AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 15, at 5-53. AsJohnson himself employs the term, it
refers to splitting open the "apparently solid log" of "the ideology of scientific
naturalism." Id. at 13. See generally PHILLIP JOHNSON, THE WEDGE OF TRUTH:
SPLITrING THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATURALISM (2000).
208. SeeJOHNSON, supra note 207, at 174.
209. This sentence implicitly rejects the conclusion of Michael Behe and
others that an inference from complexity to intelligent design is very powerful. In
part, this rejection is based on my own sense that one cannot move so easily
from the complexity that signals intelligent design in ordinary life to what sig-
nals such design in basic life processes. In part, the rejection is based on the
limited degree of acceptance the theory has among scientists.
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VIII. TEACHING RELIGION
Thus far, I have concentrated on what counts as science or
belongs in a science course. It is time now to approach our topic
from a different perspective, the one that matters for constitu-
tional law. What counts as teaching religion, and does that have
any place in a public school curriculum? In this section, I focus
on the responsibilities of educators; but the topic of teaching and
religion bears heavily on judicial enforcement of the Establish-
ment Clause, to which the last section is devoted.
Here, we need to examine four questions. What counts as
the teaching of religion? Does that category include decisions
not to teach material? What should schools say about the aspira-
tions of science as compared with other ways of understanding?
How far should educational authorities respond to the religious
sensibilities of parents? I assume that educators themselves
should be substantially guided by the values of the religion
clauses, and particularly the principle against teaching any relig-
ious propositions as true.
A. Teaching Religion: Creationism
Teaching creationism in its full-blown, literal Genesis ver-
sion is teaching religion, even if the material is taught as creation
science, scripture is not mentioned, and terms like "abrupt
appearance" are substituted for Divine Creation. The difficulty is
not that the theory has implications for some religious proposi-
tions, it is the absence of any real scientific basis for the theory.
One could believe in the theory only for religious reasons.
Although creation science purports to rest on science, it has
won extremely little support from mainstream scientists.21
Douglas Futuyma has called the work of creation scientists a "car-
icature of science . . . [based upon] no evidence."21' Philip
Kitcher has remarked that they "have constructed a glorious
fake" useful "to illustrate differences between science and pseu-
doscience."212 Creation scientists are often explicit that they
begin from a full belief in the literal truth of Scripture; Judge
Overton commented that creationists "do not take data, weigh it
against the opposing scientific data, and therefore reach ... con-
clusions .... Instead, they take the literal wording of the Book of
210. See GOLDBERG, supra note 22, at 33.
211. DOUGLASJ. FUTUYMA, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CASE FOR EVOLUTION
21 (1995).
212. KITCHER, supra note 2, at 5.
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Genesis and attempt to find scientific support for it." '21 3 Creation
science is not genuine science because neither its theses nor the
techniques of its practitioners are genuinely scientific, and its
conclusions conflict with the overwhelming weight of scientific
evidence; 214 what makes the theory religious is that religious
premises explain why the practitioners reach the conclusions
they do.215
Creation science does not become less religious if it is taught
as a plausible alternative to evolution, rather than being
presented as the truth. One cannot believe that creationism,
with its claims that the earth is new and that all kinds were cre-
ated at the same time, is a remotely plausible account of how life
developed on earth, except on religious grounds. Creation sci-
ence remains religious if it is taught as one of two plausible
alternatives.
What of the status of intelligent design? If the theory
accepts most of the features of the neo-Darwinian synthesis,
including natural selection as an explanation for many develop-
ments, it does not conflict sharply with what scientists can com-
fortably assert. On my present state of understanding, I think
scientists looking at the scientific evidence can reasonably doubt
the power of natural selection to explain as much as is often
claimed for it; further, I think a scientist might reasonably sup-
pose that some as yet unexplained idea of order or design is a
plausible explanation for some of the changes that seem most
difficult to explain by natural selection. However, as we have
seen, there could be principles of "design" in the evolutionary
process that do not involve intelligent purpose, just as we can find
"design" in the growth of embryo to baby without assuming intel-
ligent design. To assert that problems with evolutionary theory
must be resolved by intelligent design is to rely on a religious
premise; all one could say based on science is that intelligent
213. McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.Supp. 1255, 1269 (E.D. Ark.
1982).
214. One might take a "subjective" approach and ask whether creation
scientists believe that their conclusions are scientifically grounded, but this
approach seems unpromising, both because it is hard to know just how various
creation scientists conceive science and what they really believe about their
"science."
215. Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a
Hobby, 1987 DuKE L.J. 977, 980-82, and NoRD & HAYNES, supra note 174, at
134-42, assume that creationism is a religious, not a scientific theory, despite
their substantial empathy with the basic perspectives that underlie creationism.
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design is one possible component of a full theory of how com-
plex life developed.216
B. Decisions Not to Teach Evolution
Can a decision not to teach a subject matter amount to a
teaching of religion? If a subject matter, according to standards
within the discipline, would be taught but for religious views, and
it is not taught because of religious views, it amounts to a kind of
teaching of religion. The religious view is not itself directly
taught, but ideas that are opposed to the religious view are sup-
pressed for religious reasons.
As we have seen, scientists regard evolution as by far the
most convincing scientific explanation for the development of
species. In the debate before the Columbus Board of Education,
Dr. Krauss estimated that scientists would line up roughly 10,000
to 1 against teaching intelligent design.21 Although scientists do
not agree completely on scientific techniques or on the limits of
science, they think alike about what constitute convincing scien-
tific explanations. By scientific standards, evolutionary theory
wins easily over any radically different alternatives.218 In any biol-
ogy course developed without respect to religious opinions,
evolution would figure prominently, with whatever reservations
might be offered about gaps and uncertainties. Were evolution
not taught only because it conflicts with religious views, religious
premises would be dictating the content of the curriculum-
albeit in the negative form of causing material to be omitted.
216. David K. DeWolf, Stephen C. Meyer, and Mark Edward DeForrest
develop the argument that teaching intelligent design is not teaching religion.
David K DeWolf, Teaching the Origins Controversy: Science, or Religion, or Speech?,
2000 UTAH L. REv. 39; see also DAVID K. DEWoLU ET AL.,, INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN
PUBLIC SCHOOL SCIENCE CURRICULA: A LEGAL GUIDEBOOK (1999), available at
http://arn.org/docs/dewolf/guidebook.htm (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy). Jay D. Wexler takes a contrary view. Jay
D. Wexler, Note, Of Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality
of Teaching Intelligent Design in the Public Schools, 49 STAN. L. REV. 439 (1997).
One possible position is that teachers should encourage class discussion
and even express their own opinions about what is true overall, including com-
ponents of religious judgment, though making clear that the school has no
official position. I argue for a more constrained approach to discussing relig-
ious tenets in Teaching About Religion. Teaching About Religion, supra note 44.
217. See Clines, supra note 186, at A16. I do not take this "estimate" as a
serious effort to determine an actual ratio, but rather as an indication that
research scientists overwhelmingly find evolution to be the most convincing
account.
218. In this sentence, I do not take the theory that evolutionary theory is
substantially accurate, but that causal explanations of life's development need a
supplement of something like design, to be a radically different alternative.
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Such a decision would be unfaithful to the idea that the state
must remain neutral about religion.
What is true about deciding not to teach evolution is also
true about a decision at the state level to leave evolution off the
required curriculum and not to make it a topic on state examina-
tions. It is also true about teaching evolution as only "a theory,"
if the implication is that it is less well confirmed than most scien-
tific explanations.219 If either of these downgradings of evolu-
tion is done for religious reasons, the competing religious
approach is being promoted, though to a lesser degree than if
the teaching of evolution is forbidden.
An opponent of teaching evolution might respond that if a
school teaches evolution as the leading explanation of species
development, it takes a position against religion. This would be a
mistake. It is correct that if evolutionary theory is accurate, some
religious accounts of the development of life are mistaken; and it
is also correct that evolutionary theory has disturbing implica-
tions for certain religious (and some other) perspectives on
morality.220 But various government policies, such as desegre-
gating schools and fighting wars, imply that certain religious posi-
tions are misguided, and some school instruction inevitably
offends particular religious views. If the criteria for what is
taught as true do not rest on any religious judgment, a conflict
with some religious opinions does not establish that the state is
taking an antireligious position.22
219. See the requirement adopted by the Cobb County School District,
Georgia, that texts covering evolution have a sticker with a disclaimer on their
covers. Cobb County Bd. of Educ., Approval of Purchase of Science, Health and
Physical Education Textbook Adoption (Apr. 17, 2002), available at http://board
docs.cobbK12.org/Board.nsf/Public?OpenFrameSet (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy). Compare Freiler v. Tangipahoa
Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1251
(2000). Among aspects of evolutionary theory, an "old earth" and "descent with
modification" are established to a greater degree of certainty than the domi-
nant role of natural selection. See MILLER, supra note 12, at 53. Miller writes that
descent with modification "is as much a fact as anything we know in science."
The "detailed mechanism of change is theory," but that is not "haphazard guess."
Id. at 54; see also PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 177 (commenting that many "parts of
evolutionary theory ... are also all facts"). Nord and Haynes say generally that
a scientific theory "is not a hypothesis or (mere) speculation, but a comprehen-
sive conceptual scheme that relates a broad range of phenomena in a way that
provides explanatory power." NoRD & HAwuEs, supra note 174, at 157.
220. See generally MuRpw, supra note 1.
221. This issue is explored in somewhat greater depth in Teaching About
Religion, supra note 44.
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C. Science and Other Ways of Understanding
This problem, however, raises more subtle and difficult
questions about how evolution is taught as true: questions about
the authority of scientific claims of truth, and the relation
between science and other methods to reach judgments about
reality. These questions are far deeper and more general than
the particular issue about evolution, creationism, and intelligent
design 222
Because many scientific theories are overthrown and revised
as understanding increases, one would be foolish to think that
just the presently dominant scientific accounts of evolution con-
tain no errors or omissions.221 Understanding about aspects of
evolution may well change, a reality sometimes summed up ,in
the misleading statement that "Evolution is only a theory."
What is misleading about the statement is that it obscures
degrees of likelihood of revision, and the relation of evolution to
other scientific theories. Before William Harvey's discoveries in
the seventeenth century, scientists did not understand that blood
circulates (from the heart back to the heart) in the bodies of
mammals. We now have evidence of various sorts, apparently
irrefutable, that blood does circulate. The chance that this scien-
tific finding will be overthrown is extremely slight; one would not
now speak of a mere "theory" that blood circulates, although that
scientific claim, like others, is potentially open to revision. More
generally, much of evolutionary theory is no more insecure than
many other prominent scientific views. It seems extremely
unlikely that scientists will discover that the earth has existed only
6,000 years, that simple species did not precede complex ones,
and that natural selection had no role in the development of life.
If the term "theory" is here used to mean "not established to a
high degree of probability," that is at most true about only some
aspects of evolutionary theory and, in particular, its claim to pro-
vide a full explanation of life's development.
224
The relation of science to other means of discerning truth is
a more complicated subject, one we have already looked at in the
discussion of using all relevant sources of truth. To recapitulate,
do scientists tell us what really is true or do they tell us only what
is supported by scientific inquiry and standards? The traditional
222. See NoRD & HAYNES, supra note 174, at 134-35.
223. 1 mean here omissions about basic explanation. Everyone agrees
that there are omissions in the sense of accounting for why particular changes
happened.
224. See discussion in note 219, supra.
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aspiration of science has been to reveal what is really true. 225 Sci-
ence may not discover all truth but what it does discover is true,
insofar as it is accurate. Some people have always resisted the
view that science reliably indicates what is true. If the Bible is the
authoritative word of God, perhaps it is a better source of what is
true overall than any purely human discipline;226 after all, God
the Creator could have made us and the world so that the world
appears to be older than it is,2 2 7 with a fossil record that does not
accurately reflect stages of life. In an odd way, postmodernist
approaches to knowledge support this kind of claim to a
degree. 221 If one believes that all human modes of thought are
partial, ideological, and inevitably subjective, science may have
no favored status over competing avenues to truth.
Warren Nord and Charles Haynes have suggested four basic
attitudes people may take about science and religion.229 They
may think that their basic claims conflict and that (1) religion
trumps or (2) science trumps, 2 ° or (3) that the two domains are
independent, dealing with different ways of understanding,23 ' or
(4) that an integration is possible, that the two domains can be
understood to be compatible and mutually illuminating.232
A crucial issue for public schools is just what teachers should
say to students about these issues. Science teachers should
explain something about scientific methodology, about how the
claims of science are conceived, and about the possibility of com-
225. See KITCHER, supra note 49, at 11-82. Evolutionary biologists think
the world is much older than 6,000 years in much the same sense as I assume
that I am really sixty-six years old, not one or two hours old.
226. Stephen Carter notes that Christian fundamentalists not only per-
ceive evolution as contrary to their religious faith; they believe "it is demonstra-
bly false." Carter, supra note 215, at 981.
227. According to Goldberg, a nineteenth-century preacher and scientist,
Philip Henry Gosse, asserted that God had created the earth to appear to be
old. Goldberg, supra note 22, at 27.
228. Nord and Haynes discuss postmodern challenges to the pretensions
of science. NoRD & HAYNES, supra note 174, at 41, 160.
229. Id. at 117-39.
230. In areas where science and religion overlap, a person might see
some irreconcilable conflicts, without having a confident belief that either sci-
ence (as presently understood) or religion (as presently understood) necessa-
rily trumps the other. Id.
231. One version of this approach, as we have seen, is to say that science
deals with empirical truth, religion with the spiritual domain of life and with
ethics. See RocKs OF AGES, supra note 46; Gould, supra note 46. One might
think, instead, that both science and religion concern empirical truth but in
radically incommensurate ways.
232. An individual may, of course, have an amalgam of these attitudes.
He might think that some aspects of religion are in a wholly different domain
from science but that an area of overlap exists.
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peting perspectives, concluding that science itself cannot estab-
lish with certainty that its modes of inquiry about what is true in
the external world are more reliable than alternatives,233
although in many respects their scientific conclusions are con-
firmed by direct observations2 34 and by real world consequences,
such as successful medical results based on the assumption that
blood circulates. 35 Science teachers cannot be expected to
teach nonscientific alternatives to science in detail, but probably
they should suggest how science fits among human ways of con-
ceiving reality and why some members of the community believe
there are more reliable ways of ascertaining truth than scientific
inquiry.236 Ideally, these alternatives should appear elsewhere in
the school curriculum, say in history or in courses on compara-
tive religion, where they can be given fuller treatment.
2 37
A special problem concerning science and other ways of
understanding arises when arguments for a particular position
are mixed or when religious conclusions are taken as the basis
for beliefs about science or vice-versa.
People have made scriptural or theological arguments for
and against the truth of evolutionary theory. Evolution is not, or
is, compatible with God, as we understand God from a religious
perspective. These arguments are straight-forwardly religious. A
science teacher may tell students about these arguments, but he
should not discuss whether they are sound or unsound.238
The same conclusion holds for arguments that begin from
the truth of evolution and proceed to atheist or theist conclu-
sions. Although many evolutionists may be drawn to atheist per-
spectives, and not a few have forthrightly defended them, that is
not the business of science. As I have said, the full truth of evolu-
tionary theory is logically consistent with a Creator who both
establishes natural principles and sustains their operation
through time. Although someone may reasonably believe that
evolutionary theory bears on the likely truth of atheism, the latter
proposition is a religious one and is most especially not the busi-
233. See Carter, supra note 215.
234. On sonograms and similar devices, people can observe what they are
told are their own hearts doing what seems to be pumping blood.
235. A thoroughgoing skeptic about science might say that observations
are subjective (even when virtually everyone observes the same thing) and that
successful practical results may have a different explanation than the truth of
any particular scientific views. Various skeptical positions are discussed in
KITCHER, supra note 49, at 11-82.
236. NoRD & HAYNES, supra note 174, at 157-60.
237. See id. at 154 (suggesting that studying religious accounts of origins
and nature could serve a valid secular purpose of liberal education).
238. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS IDEAS
ness of science teachers in a polity in which schools are not sup-
posed to teach the truth of religious perspectives. The same
holds for arguments that evolution poses no threat to theism.
23
1
The most troubling category includes arguments from
imperfection for evolutionary theory and responses to that argu-
ment. It helps initially to distinguish a positive and negative
aspect of the argument from imperfection.24 ° The positive
aspect is that, given a process in which developments occur
according to imperceptible changes that build on the qualities of
existing organisms, we should not expect anything approximat-
ing perfection in design. That aspect of the argument uncon-
troversially asserts that the life-forms we find correspond with
what evolutionary theory says we should find. Challenges to that
aspect of the argument also should uncontroversially fall within
the domain of science and outside the domain of religion.
The negative aspect of the argument is different. It asserts
that a Divine Creator, acting directly, would not have made such
a hash of things; God, or at least the God assumed by Western
religions, would not have designed so badly. Therefore, evolu-
tion is much more plausible than Divine Creation. This argu-
ment is one of religion, or religious philosophy. It begins from
assumed characteristics of the Divine, and draws conclusions
about what we should expect from such a being. Because this
argument was made by Darwin and can be significant in a culture
in which many people begin by assuming direct creation by God,
a science teacher understandably raises the issue whether the
record science reveals is what we should expect from a Creator
acting directly. But the teacher should not attempt to resolve
that question or discuss it in depth. The negative argument that
a Creator would not have produced such imperfection, and the
responses to it, fall on the religious side of the divide between
science and religion.
D. The Proper Influence of Parental Views
If schools should not make major decisions about the sci-
ence curriculum exclusively on the basis of religious views, does it
follow that such views should have no influence on curricular
decisions? We know that these views have had a great influ-
ence-on text publishers, state educational authorities, school
boards, and teachers. But is this influence wrong in some sense?
239. Notice that an argument that evolution and theism are compatible
can be employed to defend evolution against creationism and to defend theism
against atheism.
240. See PENNOCK, supra note 2, at 246-47.
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This question is very complicated. We may distinguish sci-
ence from some other forms of inquiry, the religious views of
educators from those of parents, dominant influence from slight
influence, and influence in marginal cases from influence over
major decisions. On the first point, moral instruction, and per-
haps literature and history, differ from natural science. If most
parents regard a practice, such as premarital intercourse, as
immoral, that is a reason for school authorities not to recom-
mend it as acceptable to students. 241 It should not matter in this
respect whether or not the source of the parents' opinions hap-
pens to be religious.
24 2
On the second point, educators should not rely on their own
religious perspectives in deciding what should be taught if stan-
dards of the discipline clearly yield one answer or another.243
Nor should they allow strong parental objections based on relig-
ion to defeat teaching what standards of the discipline would def-
initely indicate.244
Whether religious views should play any role in choices
about what science to teach is more debatable, but modest influ-
ence may be all right. Religion may figure as one reason among
many for major curricular decisions, and it may play a more deci-
sive part if the choice is between subjects of roughly comparable
scientific importance for students. Very generally, the argument
is that parental resistance can be one factor in curricular
choices,2 4 5 and that resistance based on religious views should
generally not be treated worse than resistance based on other
opinions formed from outside the discipline.246 Perhaps educa-
tors' own religious views properly figure to some degree, but that
is more debatable.
241. However, it may still be desirable to encourage those students who
choose to engage in intercourse to use methods of birth control.
242. See Carter, supra note 215, at 985-86 (suggesting that religious objec-
tions to material should not be treated less favorably than other objections).
243. I put aside here the position of educators who, influenced partly by
their religious convictions, believe the discipline should be redefined to include
something that is now omitted but which does not involve the teaching of relig-
ion. A claim that science should pay more explicit attention to possible limits
of science may be viewed in this light.
244. The issue about yielding to parental objections is somewhat more
arguable than the issue of educators relying on their own religious convictions.
245. On the other hand, one can imagine a science teacher wanting to
teach a topic just because students need to understand that rigorous scientific
methods can yield conclusions at odds with popular conceptions.
246. See discussion in supra note 232. What I say here about resistance to
material would also apply to a wish that material be taught.
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The practical upshot of this analysis for the modern contro-
versy about the development of life is this: in science courses,
evolution should be presented as the dominant theory, with a
clear indication about any gaps and uncertainties, and with a sug-
gestion that some people believe evolution is perfectly compati-
ble with a religious view of the origins of life and that other
people believe religious sources provide a truer source of insight
when the teachings of religion and the findings of science con-
flict. Any proposed alternative to neo-Darwinian theory should
be taught in science as science, or as a perspective on the limits
of science, only if the alternative has substantial support in scien-
tific methodology. A teacher might comment that certain per-
plexities concerning the development of complex life and the
way natural selection works may indicate that principles of order
or design might help explain aspects of evolutionary processes,
that whether such order would point toward intelligent design is
a topic on which scientific evidence may be ill-fitted ever to speak
decisively and, in any event, is now inconclusive.
24 7
IX. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
It remains to relate these conclusions to constitutional prin-
ciples. I shall oversimplify the connection between what is
acceptable constitutionally, and what is judicially enforced. I
shall do this by assuming that courts here apply the full measure
of constitutional law, that any discretion they accord to boards of
education and teachers concerns constitutionally permissible
choices by those determining what shall be taught.248 I shall not
engage the topic of whether teachers should have any latitude to
deviate from policy set by higher-ups, if both the policy and what
the teachers want to do would be constitutionally appropriate,
viewed in isolation.
Our clearest indication of prevailing constitutional princi-
ples, and a helpful standpoint from which to develop a critical
analysis, is what the Supreme Court has said about these issues.
In 1968, it reviewed an Arkansas statute that forbade the teaching
of the theory that mankind descended from a lower order of ani-
mals. 249 The Arkansas Supreme Court had sustained the law,
finding it unnecessary to resolve whether the statute "prohibits
247. See discussion in supra note 209.
248. An alternative conceptualization is that the educators really are
bound constitutionally to do certain things but that courts will not hold invalid
decisions within a range, even if the decisions may exceed constitutional limits.
249. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). There was no record of
prosecutions under the statute, but a science teacher challenged the law. Id. at
101-02.
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any explanation of the theory of evolution or merely prohibits
teaching that the theory is true .... "250 The U.S. Supreme Court
decided that the law was unconstitutional in either event.
Justice Fortas's opinion indicated that courts should not
often intervene in curricular decisions, 251 thus implicitly
acknowledging that judges should not overturn every educa-
tional decision influenced by the religious views of parents or
educators. Instead, "the First Amendment does not permit the
State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to
the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.
'
"252
The state law proscribed a segment of the body of knowledge
"for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with... a partic-
ular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular relig-
ious group.
" 253
Epperson is directly about forbidding subject matter on relig-
ious grounds, but its principle also reaches a religious-based deci-
sion not to teach evolution or not to require its teaching.
Two decades later, the Supreme Court faced the more com-
plex variant on the evolution problem. The Louisiana legislature
required that if teachers were to teach evolution, they must also
teach creation science.254 Although proponents of creation sci-
ence claimed that substantial scientific evidence supported that
perspective, the Court concluded that the purpose was again a
forbidden aim to advance religion.
Justice Brennan wrote for the Court that the law, which
defined the theories of evolution and creation science as "the
scientific evidences for [creation or evolution] and inferences
from those scientific evidences, ' 255 impermissibly promoted a
religious point of view. Officials claimed that the act's purpose
was academic freedom, but Justice Brennan wrote that it fur-
thered neither the goal of providing a more comprehensive sci-
250. Id. at 101 n.7.
251. Id. at 104.
252. Id. at 106. No one had suggested that the law was justified by "con-
siderations of state policy other than the religious views of some of its citizens."
Id.
253. Id. at 103. In a concurring opinion relying on the statute's vague-
ness, Justice Black made the suggestion that removing evolution from the cur-
riculum might leave the state in a neutral position between religious and anti-
religious doctrines. Id. at 113. I have indicated why I do not think it is "neutral"
to wipe from the curriculum an otherwise essential topic because its theories
conflict with some religious views.
254. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
255. Id. at 581.
ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS IDEAS
ence curriculum nor the goal of freeing individual teachers to
instruct as they thought best.
256
Mentioning the "historic and contemporaneous link
between the teachings of certain religious denominations and
the teaching of evolution,"257 justice Brennan said, "[t] he preem-
inent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly to advance
the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created human-
kind."2 '5 During the legislative process, "creation science" was
treated as including belief in a supernatural creator.25 9 Since an
improper purpose rendered the statute invalid, decision on the
basis of summary judgment was appropriate.
260
Justice Powell, concurring, emphasized that in ordinary
usage "the theory of creation" is that God created the world and
its life-forms out of nothing. 261 What were apparently the major
organizations supporting creation science, the Institute for Crea-
tion Research and the Creation Research Society, both conceived
their mission as encouraging belief in a Divine Creator.262
For Powell, the statute's limitation to scientific evidences did
not render its purpose secular. The "Establishment Clause limits
the discretion of state officials to pick and choose among [sub-
jects or theories] for the purpose of promoting a particular relig-
ious belief."
26 "3
justice Scalia's lengthy dissent was in two parts, the second
of which was a sweeping attack on any "purpose" test that
256. Id. at 586-87.
257. Id. at 591.
258. Id.
259. Various efforts after the law was adopted to define "creation science"
without reference to a supernatural creator were not relevant to what the legis-
lature's purpose had been. Id. at 595-96.
260. Justice Brennan also urged that the statute discriminated in favor of
creation science as against evolution because it provided curriculum guides and
resource services (supplied by a panel of creation scientists) for the former but
not the latter. The easy answer to this contention is that the legislature under-
stood that science teachers in the main believed in evolution, and since plenty
of teaching materials were available, no curriculum guides or resource services
were needed for evolution. See id. at 630-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 598-99. In its earlier drafts, the bill talked of creation ex nihilo
by God. Only in subsequent stages was explicitly religious language eliminated,
and there was no indication that the underlying purpose was then altered.
262. Members of the latter had to subscribe to the historical and scien-
tific truth of all assertions in the Bible. Id. at 602.
263. Id. at 604. Justice Powell referred to the literary and historic value of
the Bible, and thought schools should teach "all aspects of this Nation's relig-
ious heritage." Children might be "taught the nature of the Founding Father's
[sic] religious beliefs and how these beliefs affected the attitudes of the time
and the structure of our government." Id. at 606-07. He also said that courses
in comparative religion would be appropriate.
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depends on the subjective motivations of legislators.264 The first
part of Scalia's opinion argued that even one who accepts a moti-
vation test should reject the Court's conclusion. 265 The secular
purpose required by Lemon2 66 has meant only a secular purpose,
one that can be accompanied by religious purposes.2 6 7 Examin-
ing the legislative history, Scalia found many claims in favor of
the scientific evidence for creation science. 268 The legislators'
idea of academic freedom was that students not be "indoctri-
nated" in evolution. Scalia acknowledged that legislative atten-
tion was drawn to evolution because of "the tension between
evolution and the religious beliefs of many children. But . . . a
valid secular purpose is not rendered impermissible simply
because its pursuit is prompted by concern for religious sensitivi-
ties."' 269 Justice Scalia's dissent raises serious questions about
what is an impermissible purpose and whether the court should
have sustained a summary judgment.
I have argued that at bottom creation science is a religious
theory because inadequate empirical evidence of a scientific sort
supports it. That determination could, I believe, be made as a
matter of summary judgment. If "scientists" do not have litera-
ture explaining persuasively why their endeavors are scientific,
and why their theory reaches a threshold of scientific plausibility,
a court should not have to wait for oral evidence to conclude that
their theory is essentially religious. Thus, whatever the assump-
tions of legislators who enacted the law, teaching creation sci-
ence is teaching religious ideas. That is unconstitutional and
could have been a basis for sustaining the summary judgment.
But that is not quite the ground the Court gives. It relies on
an impermissible purpose. To resolve this issue, we need to dis-
cern what purposes would be impermissible and whether a court
could be confident that they underlay the legislation. Clearly,
264. Id. at 636-39. He urged that motives are mixed, and discerning why
any single legislator voted as he or she did is virtually impossible. One certainly
cannot infer what silent legislators believed from what a sponsor said, and there
is no acceptable method to combine individual intentions into an overall legis-
lative intent. Justice Scalia has consistently rejected a subjective intent
approach to legislative purpose for interpreting statutes, and here he developed
a similar challenge for assessing a statute's constitutionality.
265. Id. at 613.
266. 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
267. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 614. A law's purpose is not necessarily to
advance religion simply because it coincides with the tenets of a religion.
268. Id. at 622-24. Witnesses also talked about the harmful effects if stu-
dents were deprived of knowledge of this alternative scientific explanation of
the origin of life. Id. at 624-25.
269. Id. at 633.
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legislators could not permissibly seek to promote the Genesis
account as true on religious grounds. Suppose, instead, a legisla-
tor wanted to satisfy his zealous fundamentalist constituents who
wished to promote the Genesis account. That also would be an
impermissible purpose. Suppose, finally, that the legislator's atti-
tude was this: "The possible truth of the Genesis account (or my
constituents' belief in that truth) inclines me not to have evolu-
tion presented as the unvarnished scientific truth; therefore, it
should be matched by instruction in scientific creationism,
though I understand that the latter has extremely weak scientific
credentials." That also should count as a religious purpose.
The Court presents substantial evidence that the main pro-
ponents of the legislation inside and outside the state legislature
had some variant of one of these attitudes. But Justice Scalia
answers, in effect, that ordinary legislators were told that creation
science has strong scientific credentials. They may have been
persuaded that it warranted treatment equal to evolution on that
basis. Even if a reason why they attended to the problem was
because of people's religious beliefs, their decision in favor of
equal treatment was based on their wish to avoid suppressing a
theory with as much scientific merit as evolution. Note that the
actual scientific merits of creation science would not then be criti-
cal; only what legislators thought.
Scalia has a point; legislators could have had a legitimate sec-
ular purpose even though, on analysis, creation science really
amounts to religion.27 ° But the Scalia position is subject to three
rejoinders. First, it is hard to explain why legislators were satis-
fied with teachers instructing in neither evolution nor creation
science if their ambition was to put a viable alternative theory
before students. Must they not have realized that this aspect of
the law, the aspect that allowed teaching neither theory, could be
explained only by religious objections to evolution?
Second, if many ordinary uninformed legislators were per-
suaded that creation science is powerful science, this very fact
may suggest that relevant purposes should be drawn from articu-
late proponents, not the silent mass. The views of proponents
might provide a rough approximation of what others really
believed; more important, perhaps the view of proponents
should carry greater intrinsic significance than the opinions of
the inert members of the legislature.27'
270. See Carter, supra note 215, at 990.
271. 1 explore this issue in Statutoy Interpretations: Twenty Questions. KENT
GREENAWALT, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: TwENTY QUESTIONS (1999). This
comment, of course, assumes that purpose analysis makes sense. Justice Scalia
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Third, to reiterate a point made earlier, if reliance on the
possible misapprehensions of not very well-informed legislators
forecloses a reliance on impermissible purpose, nonetheless, teach-
ing scientific creationism is teaching religion, and that is not
permitted.
What are the implications of these cases, and of persuasive
constitutional analysis, for "intelligent design"? I believe there
are enough conundrums with the dominant neo-Darwinian
account for text writers, science teachers, and boards of educa-
tion to conclude that it would be useful for teachers to discuss
them and, further, to suggest that whether the dominant theory
may require substantial revision or supplementation is an open
question. I am not here claiming that this qualified presentation
of neo-Darwinism is better supported by scientific evidence than
an unqualified presentation, only that it is within the range of
constitutionally permissible judgment-something judges have
to assess by the balance of scientific opinion and their own sense
of the strength of arguments. Texts and teachers could further
mention that some idea of order or design might be needed to
fill in the gaps, although more standard explanations may well
prove to suffice. Whether any design would reflect intelligent
design is an issue science cannot now resolve and might not
resolve in the future. Were educators to go further and insist
that intelligent design is probably a needed supplement to natural
selection and other aspects of neo-Darwinism,272 they would step
over the constitutional line, because this is a judgment that can
now be made only on religious grounds.273
In explaining the reasons that support evolutionary theory,
teachers cannot steer clear of all arguments that have some
implications for religious propositions. But they should not
advance religious arguments as sound or unsound. In particular,
they should be careful about how they present the argument that
imperfection supports evolution. They should not make asser-
tions about what a Divine Creator would or would not do. Courts
should decide that teachers have stepped over the constitutional
line in this respect only if they unambiguously declare the truth
or falsity of religious propositions.
could point to the difficulty of weighing various opinions in support of his rejec-
tion of reliance on subjective purpose.
272. One objection to an intelligent design approach is that it would not
make sense for God to establish natural laws and then alter them from time to
time in accord with God's aims of design. This is more a religious or philosoph-
ical objection than a scientific one.
273. See discussion in supra note 209.
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I have proposed a middle course somewhere between what
evolutionists insist is the only sound scientific approach and what
proponents of Genesis creation and intelligent design seek. I am
well aware that this counsel of moderation will have litde appeal
for either side. The lines of struggle are sharply drawn between
opposing camps that standardly accuse one another of dogma-
tism and dishonesty. The evolutionists suspect, with a good deal
of justification, that intelligent design is supported by many as a
device to sneak religious objections into the science curriculum.
Proponents of intelligent design, with a good deal of justifica-
tion, charge that their position is ruled out of court without a
hearing. Each side often tries to make the arguments of the
other look as ridiculous as possible, and neither seems much
interested in a fair appraisal of, or even a candid debate about,
how far scientific study should involve possible limits of science,
and whether critics of evolutionary theory have any solid scien-
tific basis to suppose that the development of life on earth may
involve such limits. Nonetheless, the guidelines I have sketched
make educational and constitutional sense.
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